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A Theory of Compulsory Process Clause
Discovery Rights
JEAN MONTOYA*
INTRODUCTION
Anyone who has practiced or studied both civil and criminal litigation in the
United States' is immediately struck by the relative lack of discovery devices
available to the defendant in a criminal prosecution. The sharp divergence
does not appear to be supportable and undermines the criminal trial as a truth-
seeking device. It does, however, compel rethinking the fact-gathering process
in criminal litigation and, in particular, the criminal defendant's role in
shaping the evidence at trial.
This Article examines how the Compulsory Process Clause speaks to these
issues. Approximately twenty years ago, Professor Peter Westen suggested
that we ground discovery rights in the Compulsory Process Clause.' His
approach, while acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court,3 has
proven too unwieldy for adoption. This Article revisits the important questions
raised by Professor Westen's work, makes the argument that the Compulsory
Process Clause is the appropriate source of at least certain criminal discovery
rights, and develops a new framework for resolving discovery problems in
criminal litigation. Part I describes the core rights protected by the Compul-
sory Process Clause. Part II explores the outer limits of the Clause and in
particular, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Compulsory Process
Clause as a check against the prosecution's presentation of the evidence. Part
III demonstrates the necessity, but unavailability, of formal discovery devices
to effect the "checking" function of the Clause. Part IV argues that realizing
the "checking" function of the Compulsory Process Clause necessarily means
grounding certain discovery rights in the Clause. Part IV also delineates the
appropriate scope of Compulsory Process Clause discovery rights.
The theoretical framework advanced in this Article is important. While
Westen advanced a theory which was more sweeping, it would also necessitate
a wholesale rewriting of the Supreme Court's criminal discovery jurispru-
dence; that theory has largely failed. This Article advances a more specific
theory and one that is more consonant with case law and weighty policy
considerations.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. J.D., 1985, U.C.L.A; A.B.,
1982, Princeton University. Special thanks to Professors Edward J. Imwinkelried, Randolph N. Jonakait,
and Robert P. Mosteller for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of the Article, and to Brent Triff
and Margaret Burks for their invaluable research assistance and technical support. Of course, any defects
or errors are my own.
1. The Author practiced as an Associate in the litigation section of a large commercial law firm
in Century City, Los Angeles, and as a Deputy Public Defender for the Los Angeles County Public
Defender's Office.
2. Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71 (1974).
3. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 55 n.l 1 (1987).
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I. THE CORE OF THE COMPULSORY PROCESS CLAUSE
The Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, applicable to the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,4
provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his [or her]
favor."5 At its core, the Compulsory Process Clause not only guarantees the
defendant's right to compel witnesses to attend court, but also to elicit their
testimony there.
6
In Washington v. Texas, the Supreme Court confronted Texas statutes that
disqualified an alleged accomplice from testifying on behalf of the defen-
dant.7 The Court observed that "[t]he Framers of the Constitution did not
intend to commit the futile act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the
attendance of witnesses whose testimony he had no right to use." 8 The Court
accordingly found a violation of the Compulsory Process Clause when the
defendant, charged with a shooting-related homicide, was allowed to subpoena
but not present the testimony of the alleged trigger-puller.9 The Court reached
this conclusion despite the fact that laws restricting a defendant's use of
accomplice testimony were prevalent at the time the Bill of Rights was
ratified.' While the Court did not entirely reject a historical analysis of the
Compulsory Process Clause, it did endorse the notion that modem criminal
procedure should not be governed by "'the dead hand of the common-law rule
of 1789.'' Instead, applying a functional analysis, the Court observed that
the Framers of the Constitution intended to provide criminal defendants with
the "means of obtaining witnesses so that their own evidence, as well as the
prosecution's, might be evaluated by the jury."' 2
While the outer limits of the Compulsory Process Clause remain unclear,
3
the Court's recent Confrontation Clause jurisprudence recognizes an
additional, distinct role for the Compulsory Process Clause in our adversarial
system of criminal justice. The following Part defines that role.
4. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
6. Washington, 388 U.S. at 23.
7. Id. at 16.
8. Id. at 23.
9. Id. at 16, 23.
10. See id. at 19-21.
11. Id. at 22 (quoting Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918)).
12. Id. at 20.
13. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987) (declining to decide whether and how the
Compulsory Process Clause relates to criminal discovery rights and instead applying a due process
analysis).
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II. THE "CHECKING" FUNCTION OF THE COMPULSORY
PROCESS CLAUSE
The Confrontation Clause, applicable to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 14 provides that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... be confronted with the
witnesses against him [or her]."'" The layperson would reasonably conclude
from this language that a criminal defendant is entitled to confront and,
perhaps, cross-examine the narrow class of accusers, if not also the broader
class of those whose statements incriminate the defendant. 6 Legal scholars
reasonably might agree. 7 The Supreme Court, however, has rejected both the
narrow and broad interpretations, relying in part on the role that compulsory
process plays in our adversarial system.
In United States v. Inadi,'B for instance, the defendant was convicted of
conspiring to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine, and other related
offenses.' 9 Law enforcement authorities had lawfully intercepted and
recorded five telephone conversations between various participants in the
conspiracy. These taped conversations were played for the jury at trial.20 The
defendant objected to the admission of the taped conversations on hearsay and
Confrontation Clause grounds.2' The trial court concluded, however, that the
statements satisfied the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 80 l(d)(2)(E)
governing the admission of co-conspirator declarations, that the statements
were therefore not hearsay, and that the Confrontation Clause required nothing
more.
22
IA. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
15. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
16. The distinction boils down to this: An accuser might state that the defendant stabbed the victim,
while someone who incriminates the defendant might state that the defendant had blood on his shirt at
a certain time. The distinction can be analogized to the difference between a confession and an
admission.
17. Legal scholars have argued that the Confrontation Clause prohibits the prosecution's use of
hearsay evidence in various circumstances. Professor Michael H. Graham has argued that the
Confrontation Clause requires the state to produce an available declarant "if the circumstances
surrounding the making of the statement indicate that it was accusatory in nature when made." Michael
H. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and the Forgetful Witness, 56 TEX. L. REv.
151, 192 (1978). Professor Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., has argued that where proffered hearsay makes the
hearsay declarant the prosecution's "principal witness," the declarant "must be confronted, absent excuse
or waiver." Kenneth NV. Graham, Jr., The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter
Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRiM. L. BuLL. 99, 129 (1972). Professor Westen has argued that the
prosecution has the burden of producing "the persons whose out-of-court statements it uses against the
accused ... [unless] the out-of-court statement is such that the defendant could not reasonably be
expected to wish to examine the declarant in person." Peter Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory
Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARv. L. REv. 567, 616-18 (1978)
[hereinafter Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process]; see also Peter Westen, The Future of
Confrontation, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1185, 1206-07 (1979).
18. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
19. Id. at 388-89.
20. Id. at 390.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 390-91.
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The defendant argued that the Confrontation Clause required more, namely,
that the prosecution show that the declarant was unavailable to testify before
it could offer the out-of-court statements.2 3 Although the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit agreed with the defendant and reversed the conviction,24
the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. 25 The
Court reasoned that the context in which the out-of-court statements arose
imbued them with evidentiary significance that could not be duplicated by in-
court testimony; that is, some fact which was present at the time of the
declarations and which tended to guarantee perception, memory, narration, or
sincerity could not be recreated at trial.26 It further reasoned that an
unavailability rule served little purpose since the defendant could rely on the
Compulsory Process Clause to obtain the testimony of the declarants.27
Indeed, the Court observed more than once that the defendant apparently had
made no effort to obtain the live testimony of the declarants.28
While the statements in Inadi may have been incriminating, they were not
accusatory. Because the Inadi declarants apparently knew that their conversa-
tions could be intercepted by law enforcement authorities and used against
them, the conspirators communicated in codes.29 While the prosecution used
the recorded conversations to prove the charged conspiracy, nothing suggested
that the declarants intended by their out-of-court statements to accuse the
defendant of criminal activity. As the Court described the conversations, they
were the statements "of one drug dealer to another in furtherance of an illegal
conspiracy,"30 a circumstance which could not be recreated at trial. Some
legal scholars may have hoped that the Supreme Court would limit its holding
in Inadi and find that the Confrontation Clause requires the prosecution to
demonstrate the unavailability of a declarant when the declarant's hearsay
statement is accusatory (as opposed to merely incriminating). Any such hope
was laid to rest with the Court's decision in White v. Illinois.
31
In White, the defendant was charged with sexually assaulting a four-year-old
girl.32 Although the girl was the only witness to the assault, she did not
testify at the trial.33 Instead, the girl's accusatory hearsay statements to her
babysitter, her mother, an investigating officer, an emergency room nurse, and
the examining physician were admitted to establish the elements of the
assault. 34 Despite the defendant's objections to the admission of the girl's
statements, the trial court admitted them under the spontaneous declaration
23. Id.
24. Id. at 391.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 394-95.
27. Id. at 397.
28. Id. at 390, 397.
29. Id. at 405.
30. Id. at 395.
31. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
32. Id. at 349.
33. Id. at 350.
34. Id. at 349-50.
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and medical examination exceptions to the hearsay rule." Although the girl
was never declared unavailable,36 the Court concluded that admission of the
girl's accusatory statements under these firmly rooted hearsay exceptions did
not violate the Confrontation Clause.37 As in Inadi, the Court dismissed the
utility of an unavailability rule, observing that the context of the child's out-
of-court statements imbued the child's statements with special evidentiary
value that could not be duplicated by in-court testimony.3" The Court also
observed that if the defendant had any interest in obtaining the child's
testimony, the Compulsory Process Clause and evidentiary rules permitting a
defendant to treat witnesses as hostile would aid the defendant in obtaining
the child's testimony.3 9
Inadi and White thus proffer the Compulsory Process Clause as a defense
check against the prosecution's presentation of the evidence, and in particular,
the prosecutorial use of hearsay evidence in lieu of live testimony. It is an
inadequate solution to a substantial problem, unless the Compulsory Process
Clause also embraces at least certain discovery rights."
35. Id. at 350-51. This Author has argued elsewhere that the application of hearsay exceptions to
young children's out-of-court statements often stretches the exceptions beyond recognition and that the
statements admitted in White prove the point. Jean Montoya, Something Not So Funny Happened on the
Way to Conviction: The Pretrial Interrogation of Child Witnesses, 35 ARIz. L. REv. 927, 977-86 (1993).
36. White, 502 U.S. at 350.
37. Id. at 357. Of course, similar provisions in state constitutions may be interpreted to provide
greater protection to citizens and forbid the use of accusatory hearsay statements unless the declarant
is first shown to be unavailable. See Hansel M. Harlan, Note, White v. Illinois and the "Hearsay
Clause" of the Sixth Amendment, 54 LA. L. REv. 177, 186 (1993) (predicting defense challenges based
on the Due Process Clause and state constitutional provisions). See generally Stewart F. Hancock, Jr.,
The State Constitution, A Criminal Lawyer's First Line of Defense, 57 ALB. L. REV. 271 (1993)
(discussing state constitutionalism).
38. See White, 502 U.S. at 354-55.
39. Id. at 355.
40. The lack of discovery rights to effect the "checking" function of the Clause is not the only basis
for criticizing Inadi and White. By minimizing the role of cross-examination by the defense during the
prosecution's case-in-chief, Inadi and White arguably undermine the adversarial nature of criminal
proceedings. Cf Peter Miene et al., Juror Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence,
76 MINN. L. REv. 683, 684-85 (1992) (describing the limited value of cross-examination when hearsay
evidence rather than eyewitness testimony is presented). Even assuming that complete cross-examination
could be achieved by calling the prosecution's hearsay declarant in the defendant's case, "'[o]nly a
lawyer without trial experience would suggest that the limited right to impeach one's own witness is
the equivalent of that right to immediate cross-examination which has always been regarded as the
greatest safeguard of American trial procedure."' United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 410 (1986)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting New York Life Ins. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297, 305 (1945)).
Order of proof considerations suggest that the defendant's case may come too late to counter
effectively prosecutorial use of hearsay evidence in lieu of live testimony. Indeed, Professor Westen has
argued that "the sixth amendment allocates the burden of production between the prosecution and the
defense in order to facilitate the defendant's interest in being able to secure and examine witnesses at
a time when their incriminating evidence is not yet frozen in the jury's mind." Westen, Confrontation
and Compulsory Process, supra note 17, at 616; see also Peter Westen, Order of Proof An Accused's
Right to Control the Timing and Sequence of Evidence in His Defense, 66 CAL. L. REv. 935 (1978)
(arguing that the order of proof is a matter of constitutional significance). Trial advocacy theorists
acknowledge the cognitive phenomenon of belief perseverance, the idea that people resist changing their
initial assessments about the probability of an uncertain event. See Albert J. Moore, Trial by Schema:
Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L. REV. 273, 300-03 (1989) (discussing the perseverance
effect and other cognitive phenomena in the context of trial advocacy). Although there is empirical
evidence that first impressions have less impact in legal settings than in other contexts, JOHN THIBAUT
1995]
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III. THE LACK OF FORMAL DISCOVERY DEVICES TO EFFECT
THE "CHECKING" FUNCTION OF THE CLAUSE
Assuming that Inadi and White are analytically correct,4 the cases arguably
advance adversariness by allowing both the prosecution and the defense more
flexibility in the presentation of their respective cases: The prosecution has
the choice of presenting hearsay evidence instead of eyewitness testimony,
and the defense may or may not confront the declarant during its case.
Nevertheless, given the lack of discovery devices available to the defense, the
defendant's choice is no choice at all.
Although Inadi and White free the prosecution to use hearsay evidence in
lieu of live testimony, jurors generally weigh eyewitness testimony more
heavily than hearsay evidence in their verdicts.42 Why then would a prose-
cutor use hearsay evidence in lieu of live testimony? A prosecutor may not
want to inconvenience a witness or may want to shield a vulnerable witness,
such as a child witness, from what may be a traumatizing or embarrassing
courtroom experience.43 An advocate's decision to use one form of admissible
evidence over another, however, ordinarily will be motivated by various
tactical considerations. Prosecutorial reliance on incriminating or accusatory
hearsay evidence becomes abusive when the declarant is available but not
called by the prosecution to avoid the revelation that the declarant or the
declarant's out-of-court statement is unreliable.44
& LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 54-66 (1975) (demonstrat-
ing that in a legal setting, recency effects are pervasive); Laurens Walker et al., Order of Presentation
at Trial, 82 YALE L.J. 216, 222-24 (1972) (same), a theory of belief perseverance suggests that the
change in the order of proof worked by Inadi and White could mean that the jury becomes stubbornly
committed to its initial assessment of the prosecution's hearsay evidence. Nevertheless, since the
petitioner in White fully briefed the order of proof argument, see Reply Brief for Petitioner at 13-14,
White (No. 90-6113), it is clear that whatever the practical significance of order of proof, the Court does
not view it as a matter of constitutional significance.
41. All nine Justices in White agreed that the case presented no violation of the Confrontation
Clause. See White, 502 U.S. at 356-57; id. at 358 (Thomas, J., concurring).
42. See, e.g., Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Jurors' Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence,
76 MINN. L. Rav. 703 (1992) (discussing the findings from an empirical study); Miene et al., supra note
40 (same); Richard F. Rakos & Stephan Landsman, Researching the Hearsay Rule: Emerging Findings,
General Issues, and Future Directions, 76 MINN. L. REv. 655 (1992) (same).
43. For a discussion of formal shielding devices for child witnesses, see Jean Montoya, On Truth
and Shielding in Child Abuse Trials, 43 HAsT. L.J. 1259 (1992).
44. See Nancy H. Baughan, White v. Illinois: The Confrontation Clause and the Supreme Court's
Preference for Out-of-Court Statements, 46 VAND. L. REv. 235, 254 (1993) (observing that the
"preference for certain out-of-court statements creates the incentive for prosecutors to introduce the
hearsay statements of all potentially hostile [and weak] witnesses," and predicting that "[a]fter White,
a criminal defendant should expect to face the admission of more hearsay testimony"); Harlan, supra
note 37, at 186 (predicting prosecutorial abuses). But see Anthony C. Porcelli, Note, Sixth Amend-
ment-Right to Confront One's Accuser When the Victim Does Not Testify, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 868, 881 (1993) (conceding that the prosecution could use hearsay evidence when the
victim is not particularly credible in person or if there is a risk of the defense impeaching the witness,
but arguing, nonetheless, that the Compulsory Process Clause is an adequate check against prosecutorial
use and abuse of hearsay evidence).
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A. Pretrial Interrogation: Ordinarily a Necessary
Precondition to Calling Trial Witnesses
A criminal defendant's exercise of compulsory process as a check on
prosecutorial trial tactics assumes the defendant's ability to assess the value
in presenting a particular witness at trial. In particular, a criminal defendant's
exercise of compulsory process as a check on the prosecution's use and abuse
of hearsay evidence in lieu of live testimony assumes the defendant's ability
to assess the value in presenting the prosecution's hearsay declarant."
Common sense would suggest, and trial advocacy experts agree, that the
pretrial interrogation of a potential witness is an essential prerequisite to
calling the witness at trial. 6 The courts have also recognized that the
necessary assessment will ordinarily involve the pretrial interrogation of
potential witnesses.
For example, in Gregory v. United States,47 defense counsel sought the
assistance of the motions judge when eyewitnesses to a murder and robbery
refused to talk to him unless the prosecutor was present or authorized the
interview.48 "The court ruled: 'I can't direct the Government to permit you
to talk to a Government witness. '"" 9 On the first day of trial, defense counsel
repeated his request for assistance to the trial judge, who concluded that the
ruling by the motions judge "'dispose[d] of the matter."' 5 Undaunted,
defense counsel again requested the trial court's assistance when, following
45. A theory of trial advocacy known as sponsorship theory provides that the party who introduces
particular evidence "in effect endorses the significance of that item." ROBERT H. KLONOFF & PAUL L.
COLBY, SPONSORSHIP STRATEGY: EVIDENTIARY TACTICS FOR WINNING JURY TRIALS 7-9 (1990).
According to this theory, a party will generally be worse off if his attorney, rather than his opponent's
attorney, introduces particular evidence. The factfinder evaluating an advocate's biased presentations will
discount the value of evidence introduced by the party who stands to gain from it, while increasing the
value of evidence introduced by the party harmed by it. Id. at 9. Shifting the onus to the defendant to
call the prosecution's hearsay declarant means that the costs of sponsoring the witness will be shifted
from the prosecution to the defense. No matter how successful the impeachment, even assuming that
the defendant's costs are less than usual because the jury knows that the witness is adverse, the
defendant stands to be harmed by calling the prosecution's hearsay declarant as a witness. The
prosecution's hearsay declarant is likely to say things that harm the defense. If this harm does not occur
during the defendant's examination of the declarant, then it is likely to occur during the prosecution's
"cross-examination" of the declarant in the middle of the defendant's case. See STEVEN LUBET, MODERN
TRIAL ADVOCACY: ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE 45 (1993). Accordingly, sponsorship theory generally
counsels against impeaching one's own witness. KLONOFF & COLBY, supra, at 182. A decision to do
so, therefore, must be based on a careful cost-benefit analysis of the hearsay declarant as a defense
witness. See id. at 236-39.
46. According to Professor Tanford, "Interviewing is useful not only for discovering facts, but also
for learning something about the people involved in the case. Knowing how witnesses appear and how
they react to questioning is essential for preparing their direct examination." J. ALEXANDER TANFORD,
THE TRIAL PROCESS: LAW, TAcTICS AND ETHICS 241 (2d ed. 1993). To the extent one is calling an
adverse witness, a pretrial interview (or comparable opportunity to observe or inquire) is nonetheless
critical to determining whether the witness "can give evidence favorable to your theory of the case or
inconsistent with his earlier statements." THOMAS A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES
15 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing cross-examination preparation).
47. 369 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 865 (1969).
48. Id. at 187.
49. Id. (quoting the motions judge).
50. Id. (quoting the trial judge).
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the prosecutor's opening statement, it became apparent that the Government
would not call several witnesses on its list of trial witnesses.5' This time,
however, defense counsel, "[a]pparently thinking that if the Government had
no use for these witnesses he might," sought the trial court's assistance in
interviewing these particular witnesses.5 2 The trial court judge responded,
"'There is nothing I can do about it."' 53
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the
conviction which followed a jury trial.54 Although the court accepted the
prosecutor's statement that "he did not instruct the witnesses not to talk to
defense counsel," but did advise the witnesses "not to talk to anyone unless
he, the prosecutor, were present," the court concluded that the prosecutor's
advice to the eyewitnesses "denied appellant a fair trial."" In reaching its
conclusion, the court stated: "Witnesses, particularly eye witnesses, to a crime
are the property of neither the prosecution nor the defense. Both sides have
an equal right, and should have an equal opportunity, to interview them."56
More importantly, the court observed:
[T]here was unquestionably a suppression of the means by which the
defense could obtain evidence. The defense could not know what the eye
witnesses to the events in suit were to testify to or how firm they were in
their testimony unless defense counsel was provided a fair opportunity for
interview .... [T]he prosecutor's advice to these eyewitnesses frustrated
that effort. 7
Although the Gregory court never referred to the Compulsory Process
Clause, the court implicitly recognized that a criminal defendant's exercise of
his or her right to have compulsory process for obtaining favorable witnesses
depended on the ability of defense counsel to interview the witnesses and
assess their helpfulness to the defense. In Taylor v. Illinois," the Supreme
Court explicitly discussed the Compulsory Process Clause and made a similar
observation.
In Taylor, the defendant failed to identify a trial witness in response to a
pretrial discovery request. Although defense counsel apparently visited the
witness at his home the week before the trial began,59 and counsel did amend
his discovery response to add two other names on the first day of trial,60
counsel did not amend his discovery response to add the witness in question
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. (quoting the trial judge).
54. Id. at 192.
55. Id. at 188, 189.
56. Id. at 188.
57. Id. at 189. Similarly, in Webb v. Texas, the trial judge so intimidated a defense witness with
admonitions about perjury that the witness refused to testify and was excused by the court. 409 U.S. 95,
95-96 (1972). While the judge never formally ruled that the witness' testimony was inadmissible, as a
practical matter the judge's conduct deprived the accused of the benefit of exculpatory testimony. Id.
at 98. Prosecution tactics can have the same practical impact.
58. 484 U.S. 400 (1988).
59. Id. at 405.
60. Id. at 403.
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until the second day of trial. 61 Therefore, the trial judge refused to allow the
witness to testify for the defense.62 Although the defendant asserted on
appeal that the Compulsory Process Clause required the trial court to receive
the witness' testimony in any event,63 the Supreme Court concluded that the
trial court's sanction was "not absolutely prohibited by the Compulsory
Process Clause" and that there was "no constitutional error on the specific
facts of this case.
64
The Supreme Court reasoned that, as a practical matter, the Compulsory
Process Clause differed from other rights protected by the Sixth Amendment
because "its availability is dependent entirely on the defendant's initiative,"65
and "[t]he very nature of the right requires that its effective use be preceded
by deliberate planning and affirmative conduct. '66 The Court went on to note
that "[r]outine preparation involves location and interrogation of potential
witnesses and the serving of subpoenas on those whose testimony will be
offered at trial. 67 In other words, requiring the defense to provide a list of
the witnesses it intends to call at trial as a prerequisite for allowing their
testimony would not unduly infringe on the defendant's right to compulsory
process in light of all the steps, including pretrial interviewing, the defense
necessarily takes in deciding to call a witness.6"
While the Supreme Court thus acknowledged that the pretrial interrogation
of a potential witness is ordinarily essential to calling the witness at trial,
current criminal procedure and discovery schemes typically do not provide the
61. Id.
62. Id. at 401-02.
63. Id. at 406.
64. Id. at 402. But see Alfredo Garcia, The Compulsory Process Clause and the "Sporting Theory
of Justice": The Supreme Court Evens the Score, 28 DUQ. L. REv. 619 (1990) (identifying a double
standard in the Court's jurisprudence applying exclusionary rules).
65. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 410.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 415-16. The Court's reasoning in Taylor seemingly contradicts its earlier opinion in
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982). In Valenzuela-Bernal, the Court held that even
though the Government deported two eyewitnesses, there was no violation of the defendant's due
process or compulsory process rights unless the defendant could show that the deported aliens'
testimony would have been both material and favorable. The defendant complained that the eyewitnesses
were deported before he could interview them and determine what favorable information they possessed.
Id. at 870. The Court, nevertheless, required "some plausible explanation of the assistance [the
defendant] would have received from the testimony of the deported witnesses." Id. at 871.
While the Court's holding in Valenzuela-Bernal suggests that interviewing a witness is not integral
to exercising the compulsory process right, this aspect of Valenzuela-Bernal is contrary to Taylor and
should be limited to Valenzuela-Bernal's facts. Valenzuela-Bernal emphasized the Government's role
in enforcing immigration laws. Id. at 863-66. It also explicitly distinguished deported witnesses from
witnesses present in the United States. Id. at 873 n.9. Most importantly, however, the case emphasized
that the defendant was admittedly present and in the company of the aliens throughout the commission
of the crime. 1d. at 861, 871. The Court distinguished the case from others in which it would be
"unreasonable" to require an explanation of the relevance of missing testimony. Id. at 871 n.8. Notably,
Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment, made a point of saying that "the defendant's express right
in the Sixth Amendment to compel the testimony of 'witnesses in his favor,' requires recognition of the
importance, both to the individual defendant and to the integrity of the criminal justice system, of
permitting the defendant the opportunity to interview eyewitnesses to the alleged crime." Id. at 876
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
68. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 416.
1995]
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necessary tools. Broad hearsay exceptions may be applicable at the prelimi-
671nary hearing," or in a grand jury proceeding.70 Even when eyewitness
testimony is presented to the grand jury, the defense, which is excluded from
the grand jury room, may be entitled only to receive the transcripts for those
witnesses who actually testify at trial.7' When grand jury testimony is
available to the defendant, it will not have been tested by defense cross-
examination. Furthermore, in criminal cases there is typically no right to
depose a witness for discovery purposes, 72 and the declarant, especially a
69. For instance, in California, the finding of probable cause at a preliminary hearing "may be based
in whole or in part upon the sworn testimony of a law enforcement officer relating the statements of
declarants made out of court offered for the truth of the matter asserted." CAL. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 872(b) (West Supp. 1994) (held to be constitutional in Whitman v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 262 (Cal.
1991)). The admissibility of hearsay evidence in California preliminary hearings is particularly
troublesome in light of the fact that, although the defense can call a hearsay declarant as a witness,
People v. Erwin, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), "[u]pon the request of the prosecuting
attorney, the magistrate shall require an offer of proof from the defense as to the testimony expected
from the witness." CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 866(a) (West Supp. 1994). The problem is that the
defense may not have enough information at this stage of the proceedings to make the necessary offer
of proof. See Laura Berend, Proposition 115 Preliminary Hearings: Sacrificing Reliability on the Altar
of Expediency?, 23 PAC. L.J. 1131 (1992) (describing how the new preliminary hearing procedures
obstruct truth-finding in criminal litigation). Indeed,
[t]he magistrate shall not permit the testimony of any defense witness unless the offer of proof
discloses to the satisfaction of the magistrate, in his or her sound discretion, that the testimony
of that witness, if believed, would be reasonably likely to establish an affirmative defense,
negate an element of a crime charged, or impeach the testimony of a prosecution witness or
the statement of a declarant testified to by a prosecution witness.... [But t]he examination
shall not be used for purposes of discovery.
CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 866(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1994); see also Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and
the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1166-69, 1183 (1960)
(discussing the uselessness of the preliminary hearing as a discovery device).
70. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 15.5(a), at 707-10 (2d ed.
1992) (discussing Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956), which rejected the argument that
indictments based on hearsay are invalid).
71. Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1988). But see CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 870 (West Supp. 1994)
(imposing no such restriction).
72. A minority of jurisdictions do, however, provide for discovery depositions in criminal cases.
See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1 (giving crime victims, but not other witnesses, the right to refuse
a defense interview); AIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.3(a)(2) ("[T]he court may in its discretion order the
examination of any person," upon a showing that "the person's testimony is material to the case or
necessary adequately to prepare a defense or investigate the offense, that the person was not a witness
at the preliminary hearing, .. . and that the person will not cooperate in granting a personal interview.");
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(b)(1)(A), 3.220(h)(1) (allowing the defendant to depose as of right, within
designafed limits); IND. CODE § 35-37-4-3 (1993) (allowing the defendant to depose as of right); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 813.2 (West 1994); IowA R. CRiM. P. 12(1) (providing that the state may object and the
court may disallow the deposition when the witness is a foundation witness or has been adequately
examined at the preliminary hearing); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-201(1)(c) (1993) (allowing a
deposition "if it appears that a prospective witness ... is unwilling to provide relevant information to
a requesting party and the witness' testimony is material and necessary"); NED. REV. STAT. § 29-1917
(1989 & Supp. 1993) (allowing a deposition in the court's discretion); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 517:13(11) (Supp. 1993) (allowing a deposition in the court's discretion; the court.is to consider,
among other things, the availability of other opportunities to discover the information sought by the
deposition); N.M. DIST. CT. R. CRIM. P. 5-503(A) (compelling witness statements when witnesses are
uncooperative); N.D. R. CpuM. P. 15(a) (allowing defendant to depose as of right); TEX. CODE CriM.
PROC. ANN. art. 39.02 (West 1979) (allowing deposition upon application stating the facts necessary to
constitute a good reason for taking the same); VT. R. C~iM. P. 15(a) (allowing deposition as of right);
WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.6 (allowing a defendant to depose when a material witness refuses to
discuss the case with either counsel).
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victim, could very well refuse to discuss the matter with the defense.73 It is
therefore quite conceivable that the prosecution could present accusatory or
incriminating hearsay evidence at trial and that the defense would have little
or no information about the declarant's firsthand account or story-telling
abilities.74 Under the circumstances, a defendant would be unable to make an
informed decision about whether to call the prosecution's hearsay declarant.
B. The Limits on Defense Pretrial Discovery
Of course, one way to check the prosecution's trial tactics and keep the
factfinding process honest would be to expand defense access to information
pretrial.7" As Professor Gershman has observed: "That there exists a close
nexus between limited discovery in criminal cases and enhanced opportunities
for prosecutorial suppression of evidence is self-evident. The power to control
evidence is the power to conceal it."76 Nevertheless, defense pretrial
discovery in criminal cases remains relatively limited.
In the early 1960's, several prominent scholars and jurists argued for
expanded discovery in criminal litigation.77 Though some contended that
73. The victims' rights movement is a phenomenon of the 1980's and 1990's. State constitutional
amendments recognizing victims' rights have been passed in several states. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONsT. art.
11, § 2.1; CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 28; COLO. CoNsT. art. 11, § 16(a); FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 16(b); ILL.
CONsr. art. I, § 8.1; KAN. CONsT. art. 15, § 15; MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 24; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 32; N.J.
CONsT. art. I, § 22; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23; TEx. CoNST. art. I, § 30; WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 35.
Among other things, this movement has sought to limit the defense's access to prosecution witnesses.
See Berend, supra note 69, at 1142 (discussing the admissibility of hearsay in California preliminary
hearings); John F. Yetter, Discovery Depositions in Florida Criminal Proceedings: Should They
Survive?, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 675 (1988) (documenting the role of victims' rights advocates in the
effort to abolish discovery depositions in Florida); Stellisa Scott, Note, Beyond the Victims' Bill of
Rights: The Shield Becomes a Sword, 36 ARIZ. L. RE'v. 249 (1994) (discussing the victim's
constitutional right in Arizona to refuse an interview, deposition, or other discovery request by the
defense and the corresponding enabling legislation which requires the defense to initiate any contact
with the victim through the prosecutor's office). Professor Yetter has observed that, at least in Florida,
such efforts have been motivated more by the desire to avoid the "inherent unpleasantness of being
deposed than on any demonstrated abuse." Yetter, supra, at 692.
74. The petitioner in White mentioned only in passing that the defense often has had no opportunity
to interrogate the complaining witness prior to trial. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 16, White v. Illinois,
502 U.S. 346 (No. 90-6113). The thrust of the petitioner's argument was that the prosecution should be
required to present "all, not just part, of the relevant evidence." Id. After hIadi and White, however, it
is clear that the Court discerns no problem of constitutional significance in the prosecution choosing to
present hearsay evidence in lieu of live testimony.
75. Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REv. 393, 449-53 (1992); see also
STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 5 (1984) (observing
that "adversarial rules of procedure help to ensure the fairness of the contest by affording each litigant
an equal opportunity to make the best possible case" and that "[t]he primary mechanism for ensuring
equality is pretrial discovery'); Goldstein, supra note 69, at 1199 (describing criminal procedure and
its lack of criminal defense discovery opportunities as "relieving police and prosecutor ... of the
pressures necessary to maintain their actions at the optimum level of responsibility'); H. Lee Sarokin
& William E. Zuckerman, Presumed Innocent? Restrictions on Criminal Discovery in Federal Court
Belie This Presumption, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1089, 1095 (1991) (arguing that "discovery restriction[s)
can curtail the adversarial system rather than preserve it').
76. Gershman, supra note 75, at 451.
77. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for
Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279 (advocating expanded criminal discovery); Robert L. Fletcher, Pretrial
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discovery opportunities in criminal litigation should be patterned after the
opportunities available in civil litigation, 78 none attempted to ground
discovery rights in the Constitution. Although some limited criminal discovery
advances were subsequently made,79 in no jurisdiction did the extent of
criminal discovery even approach that of civil discovery." Indeed, while
depositions are a central feature of civil discovery schemes, only a few
jurisdictions provide for discovery 8' (as opposed to perpetuation)82 deposi-
tions in criminal cases.83
Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. REv. 293 (1960) (advocating cautious development of
criminal discovery); Goldstein, supra note 69, at 1192-93 (advocating broad criminal discovery); David
W. Louisell, The Theory of Criminal Discovery and the Practice of Criminal Law, 14 VAND. L. REV.
921 (1961) (advocating broad criminal discovery, but drawing a line between ordinary crime and
organized crime); Roger J. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV.
228 (1964) (advocating broad criminal discovery).
78. See Goldstein, supra note 69, at 1192-93 (advocating the incorporation of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure into the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and emphasizing the importance of an
opportunity to depose witnesses); David W. Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?,
49 CAL. L. REv. 56, 100 (196 1) (advocating for discovery in criminal cases as full-fledged as that which
characterizes civil litigation in the federal courts, except in cases involving organized crime);
Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REv. 940, 1057 (1961) (suggesting a mutual
exchange of witness lists coupled with a mutual opportunity to depose witnesses of either side in
criminal litigation); Pre-Trial Disclosure in Criminal Cases, 60 YALE L.J. 626, 640.46 (1951)
(recommending the adaptation of various civil discovery devices, including the examination of witnesses
before trial, to criminal litigation).
79. See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, WITNESS INTIMIDATION 37-56 (1985) (tracing the history of Rule
16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal
Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth? A Progress Report, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 11 (1990)
(describing the advances as "important" but "spotty").
80. In 1961, Professor Louisell observed that criminal discovery "lags far behind" civil discovery,
"at least in terms of the five chief formal techniques of civil discovery," namely: oral and written
depositions of parties and witnesses, interrogatories to adverse parties, motions for inspection and
copying, physical and mental examinations, and demands for admissions. Louisell, supra note 77, at
923. In 1995, the observation largely remains true but for the opportunity to inspect and copy tangible
evidence. See infra note 257 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
82. Perpetuation depositions are allowed to preserve the testimony of witnesses who may be
unavailable for trial. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-260(a) (1986); ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.050 (1990);
ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 15.3(a)(1); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-44-201 (Michie 1994); CAL. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 1336(a) (West Supp. 1994); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 15(a); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86 (West 1994);
DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 15(a); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CIUM. P. 15(a); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.1900); GA.
CODE ANN. § 24-10-130 (Supp. 1994); HAw. R. PENAL P. 15(a); IDAHO CRIM. R. 15(a); ILL. Sup. Cr.
R. 414(a); IND. CODE § 35-37-4-3; IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2, IOWA R. CRIM. P. 12(2); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 22-3211 (1988); KY. R. CRIM. P. 7.10; ME. R. CIuM. P. 15(a); MD. CRIM. CAUSES R. 4-261(b);
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 35(a); MINN. R. CRiM. P. 21.01, 21.06; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 545.380 (Vernon 1987);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-201(1)(a)-(b) (1993); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-1904 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 174.175 (Michie 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13(II)(a) (Supp. 1994); N.J. R. CIuM.
PRAC. 3:13-2(a); N.M. DIST. CT. R. CRIM. P. 5-50303); N.Y. CIuM. PROC. LAW § 660.20 (McKinney
1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-74 (1986); N.D. R. CRIM. P. 15(a)(3); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 15(A); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 762 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995); R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRiM. P. 15(a); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 22-3-940 (Law. Co-op. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-1 (1988); TENN. R. CRIM.
P. 15(a); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.02 (West 1979); UTAH R. CaIM. P. 14(h); WASH. SUPER.
CT. CRIM. R. 4.6; W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 15(a); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 967.04(1) (West 1985 & Supp. 1995);
Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 15(a); see also FED.-R. CRIM. P. 15(a).
83. See Brennan, supra note 79, at 12-13 (arguing that the general prohibition on taking discovery
depositions is due for reconsideration).
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Nevertheless, broad criminal discovery makes at least as much sense as
broad civil discovery. 4 As Justice Brennan observed: "By aiding effective
trial preparation, [criminal] discovery helps develop a full account of the
relevant facts, helps detect and expose attempts to falsify evidence, and
prevents factors such as surprise from influencing the outcome at the expense
of the merits of the case."8s5 This is the same rationale that supports
extensive civil discovery schemes.86
This being the case, why did civil litigation take a different course than
criminal litigation? The answer very likely has something to do with political
expediency. Criminal defendants, who are disproportionately members of
racial minorities, 87 are not society's power brokers and have never been an
influential interest group. 88 Notably, the push for criminal discovery rights
in the early 1960's arose during the Kennedy administration's war on
organized crime,89 during which the perceived need was to facilitate
84. See Sarokin & Zuckerman, supra note 75, at 1089 (describing the unrestricted discovery in civil
cases and the severely restricted discovery in criminal matters as an "astonishing anomaly" given the
relative interests-property versus liberty-at stake).
85. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 425 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Randolph N.
Jonakait, Making the Law of Factual Determinations Matter More, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 673 (1992)
(arguing that more than the application of evidentiary rules is needed to improve the accuracy of factual
determinations at trial).
86. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) (describing the purposes served by civil
discovery); Developments in the Law-Discovery, supra note 78, at 944-46 (discussing the goals of civil
discovery).
87. For instance, while African-Americans comprised 12.1% and Caucasians 80.3% of the country's
1990 population, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1993 No.
18, at 18 (113th ed.), African-Americans comprised 29% and Caucasians 69% of all 1991 arrestees. U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED
STATES 1991, at 231. Indeed, in 1991, African-Americans comprised 44% of the population's violent
crime arrestees (Caucasians comprised 53.6%) and 31.3% of the population's property crime arrestees
(Caucasians comprised 66.4%). Id. The 1990 statistics for federal cases similarly indicate that African-
Americans comprised 29.4% and Caucasians 66.1% of convicted offenders for all offenses combined.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1990, at 33 (1993); see also
Michael Tonry, Racial Disproportion in US Prisons, 34 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 97, 102 (Special Issue,
1994) ("The better comparison is between racially disaggregated incarceration rates measured as the
number of confined persons of a racial group per 100,000 population of that group. By that measure,
black incarceration rates are six to seven times higher than white incarceration rates.").
88. See Michael Tonry, Race and the War on Drugs, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 25, 75 ("Common law
and street criminals do not vote very much and do not evoke.much sympathy from those who do vote.
They are also disproportionately members of ethnic and racial minorities."). Justice Brennan made a
similar point when he remarked:
Who are our criminal defendants? Are they people having relatives with resources capable of
helping in their defense? By and large, the so-called "white collar" criminal probably does have
the resources and friends to aid him in his defense. Justice is indeed well served when
prosecution and defense are fairly evenly matched. But is this the situation for the vast majority
of our "blue collar" defendants? Judges know that the largest percentage of these people are
indigent.
Brennan, supra note 77, at 285.
89. The Kennedy administration's war on organized crime has been described as ranking "at the
top of the nation's domestic priorities" until well into 1963 when it was displaced by civil rights.
VICTOR S. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE 51 (1971). As Attorney General of the United States during
the Kennedy administration, Robert F. Kennedy led an aggressive war on organized crime. Id. at 44-64.
In 1960, just prior to becoming Attorney General, he wrote a book, The Enemy Within, documenting
his three years investigating labor racketeering as chief counsel for the Senate Select Committee on
Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field. See ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THE ENEMY WITHIN
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prosecutions, not defenses."0 Some commentators have recently argued that
further development of criminal discovery is a task for the legislature,9 ' but
there is little reason to believe that politicians today are any more interested
in statutorily expanding discovery opportunities for criminal defendants than
they were in the 1960's. Voters have identified crime as their chief concern
(significantly, even above the economy in a time of recession), when the
crime rate actually appears to be down.9 Legislators do not want to appear
"soft" on crime or criminal defendants. 93 Recognizing the legislative
resistance to the expansion of criminal discovery, recent scholarship has
recommended more specific, and modest, statutory reforms.9 4
The chief (and perhaps less jaded) arguments of old, advanced in opposition
to expanding criminal defense discovery, invoke the words of Judge Learned
Hand. In United States v. Garsson,95 Judge Hand rejected the defendants'
request to inspect the grand jury's minutes.96 He acknowledged the "scraps
of evidence accessible" to the defense in building a case to quash the indict-
ments,97 but reasoned, in an oft-quoted passage:
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage. While the
prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose the barest
(1960). Ironically, as Attorney General, Robert F. Kennedy well knew the value of discovering
information to his war efforts. He encouraged information sharing by the Government's various
intelligence agencies and urged Congress to pass wiretapping legislation. NAVASKY, supra, at 49, 50,
55, 60, 61, 72, 74.
90. See Louisell, supra note 77, at 932-36 (arguing that pretrial discovery by defendants of
organized, professional, and conspiratorial crime should be handled differently than pretrial discovery
by the typical criminal defendant); Louisell, supra note 78, at 98-101 (emphasizing the same distinction).
Today's gangs, although not formally organized crime, evoke some of the same concerns.
91. See Sarokin & Zuckerman, supra note 75, at 1108.
92. Compare James P. Sweeney, State Violent Crime Down in '93, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.
(Afternoon Edition), Jan. 12, 1994, at A3 ("The annual crime data showed that property crimes dropped
3.7 percent, and violent crimes, 4.1 percent.") with Gerry Braun, Crime Now State's No. I Concern, SAN
DIEGO UNioN-TRIB. (Afternoon Edition), Nov. 24, 1993, at A4 (reporting that a survey of 1003
Californians found that "crime and law enforcement.., had 78 percent of the state extremely
concerned. Next were the economy, the spread of AIDS and the condition of public schools, which each
had 74 percent extremely concerned.").
93. Despite the divergence between crime statistics and public opinion polls, the political leadership
appears to be following the lead of the general, and perhaps uninformed, citizenry. See Dana Wilkie,
Anti-Crime Sentiment Has Candidates Vying for Title of 'Toughest, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.
(Afternoon Edition), May 20, 1994, at AI; Dana Wilkie, Senate OKs Tough '3 Strikes', SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB. (Afternoon Edition), Mar. 4, 1994, at A19.
94. See, e.g., Linda S. Eads, Adjudication by Ambush: Federal Prosecutors' Use of Nonscientific
Experts in a System of Limited Criminal Discovery, 67 N.C. L. REV. 577 (1989) (recommending
expanded discovery opportunities when a prosecution involves expert testimony); Paul C. Giannelli,
Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evidence, and DNA, 44 VAND. L. REV. 791 (1991) (recommending
expanded discovery opportunities when a prosecution involves scientific evidence); Edward J.
lmwinkelried, The Worst Surprise ofAll: No Right to Pretrial Discovery of the Prosecution's Uncharged
Misconduct Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 247 (1987) (recommending expanded discovery
opportunities when a prosecution involves uncharged misconduct evidence). Some specific recommenda-
tions to expand criminal discovery have been influential in effecting limited, statutory reform. See, e.g.,
FED. R. EvID. 404(b) (requiring the prosecution to notify the defense of the prosecution's intention to
proffer uncharged misconduct evidence).
95. 291 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
96. Id. at 649.
97. Id.
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outline of his defense. He is immune from question or comment on his
silence; he cannot be convicted when there is the least fair doubt in the
minds of any one of the twelve. Why in addition he should in advance have
the whole evidence against him to pick over at his leisure, and make his
defense, fairly or foully, I have never been able to see.98
In State v. Tune,99 another prominent authority for the case against expanding
criminal discovery, New Jersey Supreme Court Chief Justice Vanderbilt, also
cited the lack of reciprocity and the defendant's right against self-incrimina-
tion as reasons for denying the defendant access to witness statements and his
own confession in a murder prosecution. 100
One could counter these fairness arguments by appealing to higher moral
ground. After all, "questions of relative 'advantage"' seem like petty concerns
in comparison to the goals of truth-seeking and justice.'0 ' Nevertheless,
"justice" arguments are unnecessary because the state suffers no discernible
disadvantage in criminal litigation. 0 2 The reality is that, although the one-
way street argument retains some validity, modern criminal discovery schemes
overwhelmingly include reciprocal discovery provisions,' 3 and many require
the defendant to disclose certain defenses to the prosecution.' 4 Moreover,
98. Id.
99. 98 A.2d 881 (NJ. 1953).
100. Id. at 884-85.
101. See Developments in the Law-Discovery, supra note 78, at 1062 (raising the justice versus
conviction argument); see also Pre-Trial Disclosure in Criminal Cases, supra note 78, at 635 (making
the justice versus conviction argument).
102. See Goldstein, supra note 69, at 1152-92 (demonstrating that the advantage lies decidedly with
the prosecution).
103. See, e.g., ALA. IL CRIM. P. 16.2; ARiz. R. CRIM. P. 15.2; ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-89-116(c)
(Michie 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1054.3 (West Supp. 1994); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 16, pt. II; DEL.
SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 16(b); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(d); IDAHO CODE § 19-1309(3) (1987); IDAHO CRIM.
R. 16(c); ILL. Sup. CT. R. 413; IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2; IoWA R. CRIM. P. 13(3); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-3212(c) (1988 & Supp. 1993); KY. R. CRIM. P. 7.24(3); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 724-25
(West 1981); ME. R. CRIM. P. 16A(a)(l)-(2); MD. CRIM. CAUSES R. 4-263(d); MASS. R. CRIM. P.
14(a)(3); MINN. R. CpiM. P. 9.02; MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-323 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1916
(1989); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 174.255 (Michie 1992); N.J. R. CRIM. PRAC. 3:13-3(b); N.M. DIsT.
CT. R. CRIM. P. 5-502; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 240.30, 240.40(2) (McKinney 1994); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-905 (1988); N.D. R. CRiM. P. 16(b); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16(C); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.835
(1990); PA. R. CRIM. P. 305(C); S.C, R. CRIM. P. 5(b); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-13-12 (Rule
16(b)(1)(A)), 23A-13-13 (1988); TENN. R. CRIM. P. 16(b); VT. R. CRIM. P. 16.1; VA. Sup. CT. R.
3A:! 1(c); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.7(b); W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 16(b); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.23(3)-
(5) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994); Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 16(b); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b).
104. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010(b) (1990) (insanity); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.2(b) (various
defenses); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-304(a) (Michie 1993) (mental disease or defect); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 16-7-102 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994) (alibi); CONN. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. §§ 758 (mental disease
or defect), 763 (alibi); DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(a) (insanity); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P.
12.1 (alibi), 12.2 (insanity); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.200 (alibi); GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 31.1 (insanity or
mental illness); IDAHO CODE § 19-519 (1987) (alibi); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 413(d) ("any" defenses); IND.
CODE §§ 35-36-2-1 (insanity), 35-36-4-1 (alibi); IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2 (West 1994); IOWA R. CRIM.
P. 10(1 l)(a) (alibi), (b) (insanity and diminished responsibility), (c) (intoxication, entrapment, and self-
defense); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3218 (1988) (alibi); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 504.070(1) (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1990) (mental illness or insanity); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 726 (defense based
on mental condition), 727 (alibi) (West 1981); ME. R. CRIM. P. 16A(a)(3) (alibi); MD. CRIM. CAUSES
R. 4-263(d)(3) (alibi); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(b)(1) (alibi), (b)(2) (mental disease or defect), (b)(3) (other
defenses); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 768.20 (alibi), 768.20a (insanity) (West 1982 & Supp. 1994);
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.02 subd. (l)(3)(a) ("any" defense); Mo. SuP. CT. R. CRIM. P. 25.05A(4) (mental
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law enforcement officers who investigate crimes and question arrestees before
defense counsel is appointed routinely obtain incriminating statements from
criminal defendants, despite Miranda warnings. 0 5 The prosecution also
enjoys significantly better access than the average criminal defendant to crime
laboratories to conduct appropriate scientific testing.0 6 Therefore, whatever
the state of the law and police science when Judge Hand and Chief Justice
Vanderbilt were writing, their observations about the one-sidedness of
criminal discovery are simply no longer accurate.
10 7
Chief Justice Vanderbilt gave other reasons for divergent civil and criminal
discovery schemes: He suggested that criminal defendants who knew the
whole of the evidence against them would "procure perjured testimony in
order to set up a false defense" and bribe or intimidate the witnesses against
them.' Justice Brennan, dissenting in Tune, retorted that the experience in
civil cases allowing liberal discovery, and the experience in England and
Canada where the criminal defendant enjoys broad discovery opportunities,
did not support Justice Vanderbilt's predictions.'0 9 Five years later, citing
disease or defect); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-323(2) (good character, alibi, compulsion, entrapment,
justifiable use of force, or mistaken identity), (3) (mental disease or defect) (1993); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 29-1927 (Supp. 1994) (alibi), § 29-2203 (1989) (insanity); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 174.087 (Michie
1992) (alibi); N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 100 (alibi); N.J. R. CRIM. PRAC. 3:11-1 (alibi), 3:12 (insanity), 3:12A
(various defenses); N.M. DIST. CT. R. CRIM. P. 5-508 (alibi); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 340.30
(McKinney 1993-1994) (mental disease or defect, alibi); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-959 (1988) (insanity);
N.D. R. CRIM. P. 12.1(a) (alibi); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.58 (Baldwin 1992) (alibi); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, §§ 585 (alibi), 1176(A) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993-1994) (mental illness or insanity); OR.
REv. STAT. § 135.455 (1990) (alibi); PA. R. CRIM. P. 305(C)(1)(a) (alibi), (b) (insanity or mental
infirmity); R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 12(c) (insanity); S.C. R. CRIM. P. 5(e) (alibi), (f) (insanity or
guilty but mentally ill); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-9-1 (Rule 12.1(a)) (1988) (alibi); TENN. R.
CRIM. P. 12.1 (alibi), 12.2 (insanity or mental condition); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.03
(West 1979 & Supp. 1995) (insanity); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 16(c) (alibi or insanity); VT. R. CRIM. P.
12.1(a) (alibi, insanity, or mental condition); VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:l 1(c)(2) (alibi), (3) (insanity); WASH.
SUPER. CT. R. 4.7(b)(2)(xii)-(xiv) (the defendant may be ordered to state the general nature of the
defense and whether or not he or she will rely on alibi or insanity); W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 12.1 (alibi),
12.2 (insanity or mental condition); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.23(8) (West 1985) (alibi); Wyo. R. CRIM.
P. 12 (alibi); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2 (notice of defense based on mental condition).
105. See William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L. REV. 1903,
1924 (1993) (arguing that certain doctrines and practices appropriately facilitate maximum evidence
gathering by the police, unimpeded by defense counsel, at the start of criminal cases); see also Brennan,
supra note 77, at 292 (dismissing the fairness argument given the widespread pretrial interrogation of
criminal defendants by the police); Fletcher, supra note 77, at 312 (dismissing the argument that
allowing broad discovery is unfair to the state, especially given the common pretrial interrogation of the
defendant and others by the police).
106. Professors Paul C. Giannelli and Edward J. Imwinkelried have observed that 80% of the more
than 300 crime laboratories in this country are under state control, I PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD
J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 3-1, at 74 (2d ed. 1993), and that most of these laboratories
(57%) will examine only evidence that has been submitted by law enforcement officials. I Id. § 4-1,
at 110.
107. Chief Justice Vanderbilt's argument would also appear to be disingenuous given that the
defendant in the case allegedly signed a fourteen-page confession. State v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881, 883 (N.J.
1953). The confession was apparently obtained from the defendant between the hours of 12:20 a.m. and
5:00 a.m. on August 24, 1952, two days after the alleged murder, while the defendant was in custody
and without counsel. Id. at 895 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108. Tune, 98 A.2d at 884.
109. Id. at 894-95 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Professor Louisell described the English "preliminary
hearing-deposition procedure" as the "quintessence of discovery." Louisell, supra note 78, at 64. For
a description of the English procedure, see id. at 64-67.
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the lack of empirical evidence in support of Chief Justice Vanderbilt's
reasoning, the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Johnson"0 disavowed
Tune, at least with respect to a defendant's opportunity to see his or her own
confession."'
Some might argue that witness intimidation is a genuine concern. Relying
on studies from the 1970's, Professor Michael Graham has concluded that
witness intimidation is a "pervasive problem."".2 He has observed that it is
a more serious problem in federal than in state prosecutions, primarily
because of the relative frequency with which organized crime is prosecuted
in federal courts." 3 Professor Graham, however, can hardly link witness
intimidation to the availability or expansion of formal defense discovery in
criminal cases. For example, in addition to the organized crime context,
Professor Graham has identified domestic violence cases as involving "[a]
great deal of witness intimidation.""' 4 However, in the latter context, the
defendant presumably well knows who the government's witnesses are. As
commentators have observed, guilty defendants will have significant personal
knowledge of the government's case and its witnesses despite minimal
discovery opportunities; it is the innocent defendant who is at a loss to
prepare a defense when discovery is limited." 5 To the extent that witness
intimidation is a problem attributable to formal defense discovery, state
legislatures appropriately include provisions for protective orders in their
criminal discovery schemes." 6
The expansion of criminal discovery therefore not only makes good sense,
it also furthers important policy interests articulated by the Supreme Court:
"We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in
which the parties contest all issues before a court of law. The need to
110. 145 A.2d 313 (N.J. 1958).
111. Id. at 316-17.
112. GRAHAM, supra note 79, at 4.
113. Id. at 5, 52, 56.
114. Id. at5.
115. Developments in the Lan-Discovery, supra note 78, at 1057 (favoring expanded discovery
despite the risks); Pre-Trial Disclosure in Criminal Cases, supra note 78, at 639 (observing that the
advantages of disclosure outweigh potential abuses).
116. See, e.g., ALA. R. CRIM. P. 16.4; ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 15.5; ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-89-116(e)
(Michie 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1054.2 (West Supp. 1994) (prohibiting attorneys from
disclosing a victim or witness's address or telephone number to the defendant); COLO. R. CRIM. P.
16(d)(2); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86d to -86e (West 1994) (restricting the disclosure of a sexual
assault victim's address or telephone number); DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 16(d)(1); FLA. R. CRIM. P.
3.220(b)(2), (e); IDAHO CODE § 19-1309(5) (1987); IDAHO CRIM. R. 16(k); ILL. SuP. CT. R. 412(i);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2 (West 1994); IowA R. CRIM. P. 13(6)(a); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3212(e)
(1988 & Supp. 1993); Ky. R. CRIM. P. 7.24(6); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 729.1(B) (West 1981);
ME. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(6); MD. CRIM. CAUSES I 4-263(i); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(a)(6); MINN. R. CRIM.
P. 9.01, subd. 3(2); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-328 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1912(2)(e), (4)
(1989); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 174.275 (Michie 1992); N.J. R. CRIM. PRAC. 3:13-3(d); N.M. DIST.
CT. R. CRIM. P. 5-501(E); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.50 (McKinney 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
908 (1988); N.D. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16(E)(I); OR. REv. STAT. § 135.873 (1990);
PA. R. CRIM. P. 305(F); S.C. R. CRIM. P. 5(d)(1); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-13-16 (1988);
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1); UTAH R. CRiM. P. 16(f); VT. IR CRIM. P. 16.2(d); VA. SUP. CT. R.
3A:l1(f); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.7(h)(4); W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(l); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 971.23(6) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994); WYO. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1).
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develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and
comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if
judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of
the facts .... 7
The Supreme Court thus recognized that both the adversary system and trial
as a truth-seeking device are the prominent concerns in its discovery
jurisprudence. Justice Brennan had earlier identified the relevant tension in the
title of his important article on criminal discovery rights, The Criminal
Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?"' It is not an either/or
proposition; a principled answer will be premised on the concept of adver-
sarial contest as the means to the truth about disputed past events. Making
that contest meaningful is the key.
C. Bridging the Gap
The adversarial contest in criminal litigation may not be meaningful. Inadi
and White proffer the Compulsory Process Clause as a check against the
prosecution's presentation of the evidence, and in particular, the prosecutor's
use and abuse of hearsay evidence in lieu of live testimony. Nevertheless, a
criminal defendant's exercise of compulsory process for obtaining favorable
witnesses should obviously be preceded by the interrogation of the witnesses.
Indeed, a lawyer could be guilty of ineffective assistance of counsel if the
lawyer called the prosecution's hearsay declarant, or anyone else as a witness,
without first having interviewed or otherwise interrogated the witness, either
personally or through an investigator." 9 Yet, the necessary discovery tools
are lacking. The upshot is that, unless criminal discovery expands in
significant ways, there is a gap between the asserted "checking" function of
the Clause and the ability to effect that function.
The court in Gregory was willing to reverse the conviction because the
"prosecutor's advice to the[] eye witnesses frustrated [defense] ... effort[s]"
to interview the witnesses. 20 But what if witnesses refuse to talk to either
117. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408-09 (1988) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
709 (1974)).
118. See Brennan, supra note 77.
119. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that the defendant was not denied
the effective assistance of counsel, but recognizing that counsel has a duty to make reasonable
investigations or to make a reasonable decision not to investigate; counsel, among other things, failed
to meet with the defendant's wife and mother before the defendant's capital sentencing hearing); Ewing
v. Williams, 596 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1979) (remanding for a showing of prejudice, but accepting the
district court's finding that counsel failed to perform a number of duties that may be reasonably
expected of competent counsel; counsel, among other things, failed to conduct a pretrial interview of
the government's key witness or to interview any potential defense witnesses); People v. Shaw, 674 P.2d
759 (Cal. 1984) (holding that a defense attorney's tactical decisions must be informed by adequate
investigation and that counsel's omissions-failing to interview witnesses in support of defendant's alibi
defense and mistaken identity claim--deprived the defendant of the effective assistance of counsel);
People v. Bess, 200 Cal. Rptr. 773 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that defense counsel's failure to
interview eyewitnesses to the robbery constituted ineffective assistance of counsel).
120. Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 865
(1969). Indeed, several state criminal discovery statutes include provisions prohibiting parties and their
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side or refuse to talk to the defense of their own accord and not because of
something that the prosecutor has told them?.2 1 The necessity and desirability
of witness interrogation is no less, but there is a dearth of statutory provisions
to facilitate their pretrial interrogation by the defense. Perhaps the Compul-
sory Process Clause can bridge this gap between the "checking" function of
the Clause and its effectuation.
IV. GROUNDING CERTAIN DISCOVERY RIGHTS IN THE
COMPULSORY PROCESS CLAUSE
Professor Robert N. Clinton, author of a seminal article on the criminal
defendant's right to present a defense, has described the history of the Sixth
Amendment as "vague," noting the "remarkably limited" reports of the
congressional debates.' 22 Professor Westen has similarly pointed to a
"paucity of debate regarding the substance of the right of compulsory
process."' 23 However, at least one early historian of the Clause, Joseph
Story, made the following observation regarding the right guaranteed by the
Compulsory Process Clause:
The common suggestion has been, that in capital cases no man could, or
rather ought, to be convicted, unless upon evidence so conclusive and
satisfactory, as to be above contradiction or doubt. But who can say,
whether it be in any case so high, until all the proofs in favour, as well as
against, the party have been heard? Witnesses for the government may
swear falsely, and directly to the matter in charge; and, until opposing
testimony is heard, there may not be the slightest ground to doubt its truth;
and yet, when such is heard, it may be incontestible, that it is wholly
unworthy of belief.'
Story thus recognized that an important function of the Clause was to check
the prosecution's presentation of the evidence (the very purpose recognized
agents from impeding the free flow of information from witnesses (except the defendant) to the
opposition. See, e.g., COLO. R. CRIM. P. 16, pt. II(a); FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.220(i); ILL. Sup. CT. R. 415;
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.03, subd. I; MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-330 (1993); VT. R. CRiM. P. 16.2(a);
WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.7(h)(1).
121. Professor Louisell observed that "[tihe accused ... is generally disadvantaged relative to the
state in respect of the approachability of witnesses." Louisell, supra note 78, at 87 (discussing the
psychology of the investigative process). He further observed:
Likely the reason that one does not hear proposals to allow the state to take discovery
depositions of witnesses other than [the] defendant is that realistically there is no need of such
depositions because the informal availability of witnesses to the state's interrogation is
generally satisfactory. And the state's capacity to question the defendant, with the aim of
procuring confession, normally makes all but irrelevant defendant's non-amenability to
deposition.
Id. at 89-90; see also Goldstein, supra note 69, at 1191-92 (describing the advantages enjoyed by the
prosecution in witness interrogation).
122. Robert N. Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in
Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REv. 711, 728 (1976).
123. Westen, supra note 2, at 98. For an excellent description of the history of the Clause, such as
it is, see id. at 95-101.
124. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1786, at 664(1833).
1995]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
in Inadi and White). Moreover, Story recognized that such was necessary to
effect truth-finding at trial.
At issue here is whether the Clause embraces discovery rights to effect the
"checking" function. Professor Clinton rejected the notion that a right to
defend, including discovery rights, should be grounded in the Compulsory
Process Clause.'25 He argued that reliance on the express guarantees of the
Sixth Amendment "often strained beyond recognition the language" of its
clauses. 26 Indeed, taking issue with even the Supreme Court's application
of the Compulsory Process Clause in Washington v. Texas, 27 Professor
Clinton wrote that "a good argument can be made that the sixth amendment
was designed to do simply what it says-to grant the subpoena power to the
accused which he lacked at common law."' 12 1 Instead, he proposed grounding
a right to defend in the "open-ended, flexible contours of the due process
clause."'' 29 As will be demonstrated below, however, limited discovery rights
are appropriately grounded in the Compulsory Process Clause.
A. The Compulsory Process Clause: Text and Context
The Compulsory Process Clause guarantees the defendant "compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his [or her]favor," but what does it mean
for witnesses to be "in the defendant's favor?" The opinion in White discusses
coupling the Compulsory Process Clause with evidentiary rules permitting
litigants to treat witnesses as hostile (that is, rules allowing the use of leading
questions with uncooperative witnesses). But how is it that the defendant must
rely on evidentiary rules permitting the treatment of a witness as hostile in
order to exercise the defendant's constitutional right to obtain witnesses in his
[or her] favor? It would appear to be a contradiction in terms. Professor
Westen has argued that impeaching evidence, like exculpatory evidence, is a
witness in the defendant's favor. 31 It certainly makes sense that any
evidence that advances the defendant's position, be it evidence establishing
an affirmative defense or a failure of proof-type defense (such as evidence
attacking the credibility of the state's star witness), is evidence in the
125. Clinton, supra note 122, at 793 & n.386 (1976).
126. Id. at 756.
127. 388 U.S. 14 (1967); see also supra text accompanying notes 6-12.
128. Clinton, supra note 122, at 767. The Court, however, explicitly rejected this argument in Taylor
v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 406-09 (1988). See also STORY, supra note 124, §§ 1786-1787, at 663-66
(suggesting that the adoption of the Compulsory Process Clause was, in part, meant to counter the
common law practice of allowing the defendant to call witnesses but not allowing defense witnesses to
be sworn).
129. Clinton, supra note 122, at 783.
130. See Westen, supra note 2, at 121-26; see also Peter Westen, Compulsory Process II, 74 MICH.
L. REV. 191, 232 (1975). Brady v. Maryland and its progeny, delineating the prosecution's duty,
pursuant to due process, to disclose material evidence favorable to the defense, have similarly equated
impeachment and exculpatory evidence. See, e.g., Brady, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) ("In Brady and Agurs, the prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory evidence.
In the present case, the prosecutor failed to disclose evidence that the defense might have used to
impeach the Government's witnesses by showing bias or interest. Impeachment evidence, however, as
well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule.").
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defendant's favor."' Moreover, "[b]y its very terms, the compulsory process
clause assumes that a defendant may wish to call witnesses who will appear
on his [or her] behalf only if compelled by the court.' 1 32 Accordingly,
prosecution witnesses are not beyond the reach of the Clause.
Nevertheless, who are these "witnesses?" The question is an important one
because the answer could dictate the scope of rights protected by the Clause.
For instance, if the term "witnesses" in the Compulsory Process Clause were
limited to those who testify at trial, then Washington v. Texas could approach
the outer limits of the Clause. 3 3 If the term included all those with relevant,
personal knowledge, however, then the Clause might very well embrace
discovery opportunities.
Justice Scalia discussed the meaning of the term in the context of the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 134 He identified two possible
definitions: "(a) one 'who knows or sees any thing; one personally present'
or (b) 'one who gives testimony' or who 'testifies,' i.e., '[i]n judicial
proceedings, [one who] make[s] a solemn declaration under oath, for the
purpose of establishing or making proof of some fact to a court.""' 135 Justice
Scalia rejected the former definition as inconsistent with the surrounding
language in the Confrontation Clause, "witnesses against him."'36 He
concluded that the term "witnesses," thus contextualized, "obviously refers to
those who give testimony against the defendant at trial.' 3 7
His textual analysis, 3 1 though scientific in tone, is nevertheless uncon-
vincing. Justice Scalia's point is that the Clause does not "expressly" exclude
hearsay evidence; rather, the Clause governs testimony admitted in court (that
is, the Clause ensures the defendant the opportunity to confront those who
actually testify in court for the prosecution). 39 No doubt, the Clause
131. Similarly, in Chambers v. Mississippi, the defendant called McDonald to the stand. 410 U.S.
284, 291 (1973). McDonald had apparently confessed to the killing with which the defendant was
charged and subsequently recanted. Id. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to cross-examine
McDonald on the basis of a Mississippi common-law rule that a party may not impeach his own
witness. Id. at 295. On appeal, the Supreme Court considered the defendant's right of confrontation:
The availability of the right to confront and to cross-examine those who give damaging
testimony against the accused has never been held to depend on whether the witness was
initially put on the stand by the accused or by the State. We reject the notion that a right of
such substance in the criminal process may be governed by that technicality or by any narrow
and unrealistic definition of the word "against."
Id. at 297-98.
132. Westen, supra note 130, at 232.
133. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
134. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 864 (emphasis in original) (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).
136. Id. at 864-65 (emphasis in original).
137. Id. at 865.
138. For a discussion of Justice Scalia's textualism, see George Kannar, The Constitutional
Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297 (1990), and Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Right of
Confrontation, Justice Scalia, and the Power and Limits of Textualism, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1323
(1991). For a more general discussion of textualism and other methods of constitutional argument, see
PHILIP BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982).
139. Craig, 497 U.S. at 865.
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governs the taking of evidence at trial. But the term "witnesses," thus
contextualized, could just as well refer to those hearsay declarants whose
statements are offered "against the defendant" at trial. 140 Indeed, a majority
of the Supreme Court has consistently assumed that when the prosecution
offers hearsay evidence at trial, "hearsay declarants are 'witnesses against' a
defendant within the meaning of the Clause.'. 4 1
Since the term "witnesses" in the Confrontation Clause includes those
whose out-of-court statements are offered in court by the prosecution, the
term embraces more than those who actually come to court and testify. If the
term "witnesses" in the Compulsory Process Clause were similarly under-
stood,142 the term could be interpreted to embrace not only those who are
ultimately subpoenaed for trial, but all those who have relevant, personal
knowledge about the case, whether or not they are ultimately subpoenaed,
implicating certain discovery rights. Even if one were to credit Justice
Scalia's textual argument, the language of the Confrontation Clause could be
read as being limited to those who actually testify, and the Compulsory
Process Clause as contemplating some discovery rights, since the Compulsory
Process Clause talks about "obtaining witnesses."'
' 43
For instance, in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,14 4 the Supreme Court found no
Confrontation Clause violation when the defendant in a child abuse case was
denied access to the confidential file of a protective services agency but was
able to cross-examine all the witnesses "fully.' ' 45 A plurality reasoned that
the rights embodied in the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause were trial
rights.'46 The Court accordingly held that the right to cross-examine a
witness "does not include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any
and all information that might be useful in contradicting unfavorable
testimony."1 47 If the Compulsory Process Clause were similarly limited as
a trial right, the right to secure the attendance and testimony of witnesses
140. For a discussion of how various legal scholars have interpreted the term "witnesses" in the
Confrontation Clause, see Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Confrontation and Hearsay: Exemptions from the
Constitutional Unavailability Requirement, 70 MINN. L. REv. 665, 677-82 (1986).
141. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 359 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring). Evidence codes also treat
hearsay declarants in roughly the same fashion as live opposing witnesses. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 806
(providing for the impeachment of hearsay declarants).
142. When a drafter uses the same term in another part of the same document, we ordinarily presume
that he or she meant it in the same sense. This maxim of interpretation carries special weight here, since
the clauses are close to one another in the same constitutional amendment. See Randolph N. Jonakait,
Foreword: Notes for a Consistent and Meaningful Sixth Amendment, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
713, 737 (1992) (arguing that "[i]f compulsory process and confrontation are read as part of one Sixth
Amendment, it can hardly make sense for 'witnesses' to have one meaning for confrontation and a
different one for compulsory process").
143. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
144. 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (plurality opinion).
145. Id. at 54.
146. Id. at 52. The Court's position did not go unchallenged. See id. at 61-66 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (rejecting the plurality's conclusion that the Confrontation Clause protects only a defendant's
trial rights and has no relevance to pretrial discovery); id. at 66-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (same).
147. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 53.
[Vol. 70:845
COMPULSORY PROCESS
would not include a right to compel the pretrial (or extra-trial)'48 production
of persons and tangible objects that might be necessary to mount the
adversarial contest anticipated by the Sixth Amendment. Nevertheless, Ritchie,
which also addressed the scope of the Compulsory Process Clause, notably did
not suggest that the Clause embodied only trial rights.'4 9
The scope of the Confrontation Clause does not dictate the scope of the
Compulsory Process Clause. 50 In Ritchie, the Court asserted that a defen-
dant's right to substantive cross-examination of the prosecution's witnesses
did not "transform the Confrontation Clause into a constitutionally compelled
rule of pretrial discovery."' 5' Some may argue that the right to compel the
attendance of "witnesses in the defendant's favor" and to elicit their testimony
at trial similarly does not transform the Compulsory Process Clause into a
constitutionally compelled rule of pretrial discovery. But while the defendant
can, however imperfectly and unadvisedly, confront and cross-examine
witnesses without pretrial discovery, the defendant cannot call a witness "in
his favor" without some pretrial discovery indicating that the witness is a
witness "in the defendant's favor." While the concept of a witness "in the
defendant's favor" is broadly construed,' 52 it is still a fundamental aspect
of the Compulsory Process Clause right.'53
The right to obtain witnesses in one's favor as a check against the
prosecution's presentation of the evidence must include the right to assess
whether the testimony will be favorable. 54 It is inconceivable that the
Supreme Court has proffered to the criminal defendant the right of securing
the attendance of the prosecution's hearsay declarants at trial, and even
receiving their testimony there, without giving the concomitant right to
determine what the hearsay declarants will say before they take the stand. The
148. By "extra-trial," this Article refers to the possibility of discovery opportunities arising after trial
has begun, but separate and apart from the trial itself.
149. See infra notes 209-16 and accompanying text.
150. Although Professor Westen has argued that "these two provisions-much like a physical object
and its own mirror image-are both the converse of one another and yet substantially identical," Westen,
Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 17, at 569, he has also observed that "[c]ompulsory
process ... is more than a trial right. It gives the defendant the right to discover the existence of
witnesses in his favor." Westen, supra note 2, at 183-84. Although I disagree with Professor Westen
about the appropriate scope of Compulsory Process Clause discovery rights, see infra note 203, I agree
and argue below that the Compulsory Process Clause is more than a "trial right" in the narrow, Ritchie
sense of the phrase.
151. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 52.
152. See supra notes 130-132 and accompanying text.
153. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bemal, 458 U.S. 858, 867-73 (1982); see also United States
v. Minh The Tran, 16 F.3d 897, 905-06 (8th Cir. 1994) (affirming the defendant's conviction despite
the trial court's refusal to grant a continuance to secure the presence of alibi witnesses); Virgin Islands
v. Mills, 956 F.2d 443 (3rd Cir. 1992) (reversing the defendant's conviction because the trial court did
not allow testimony of a witness who originally was held in contempt but later was willing to testify
that the defendant was not the man whom he had observed near the crime scene); United States v.
North, 910 F.2d 843, 889-92 (D.C. Cir.) (finding no reversible error in the trial court's quashing of a
subpoena to former President Ronald Reagan), modified on other grounds, 920 F.2d 940 (1990), cert.
denied, 500 U.S. 941 (1991).
154. Professor Westen has observed that "[b]ecause compulsory process is designed to enable the
accused to present a defense, he must have time to prepare that defense. To achieve its purpose at trial,
it must be available before trial." Westen, supra note 2, at 104-05.
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Court has acknowledged the absurdity of granting the accused the hollow right
of calling witnesses whom they could not put on the stand.'55 It is equally
absurd to guarantee the accused the compulsory process right without also
guaranteeing any opportunity to determine in advance whether the testimony
will be favorable. The defense must be able to interview and call and examine
the witnesses. Accordingly, in United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,'56 the
Court acknowledged that the Compulsory Process Clause appropriately
embraced a right to pretrial discovery when it would otherwise be "unreason-
able to require [the defendant] to explain the relevance of... missing
testimony."' 57
In Powell v. Alabama, 58 discussing the right to counsel,' 59 the Court
interpreted the right as requiring counsel not only at trial, but before trial:
[F]rom the time of [the defendants'] arraignment until the beginning of [the
defendants'] trial, when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and
preparation [a]re vitally important, the defendants did not have the aid of
counsel in any real sense, although they were as much entitled to such aid
during that period as at the trial itself'6'
Describing the right to counsel without the right to counsel's pretrial
assistance as "vain,"'' the Court specifically reasoned that defense counsel
could not hope to be effective at trial without pretrial preparation.
As with the right to counsel, the right to compulsory process, understood
as the right to check the prosecution's presentation of the evidence and to
present a defense at trial, is meaningless unless the defense has access to and
can assess at least certain evidence pretrial (or extra-trial). Accordingly, the
Court not only recognized the importance of a pretrial right of production
grounded, at least in part, in the Compulsory Process Clause, but actually
upheld such an order in United States v. Nixon.'
62
In Nixon, a unanimous Court 163 upheld an order of the district court
requiring President Nixon to produce tapes of his personal conversations with
the Watergate defendants for in camera inspection by the court. 64 The Court
observed that the right to the production of the tapes derived in part from the
155. See supra text accompanying note 8.
156. 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
157. Id. at 871 n.8 (citing United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694)).
For a fuller discussion of Valenzuela-Bernal, see supra note 67.
158. 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated since
counsel were appointed on the eve of trial with no opportunity to investigate the case).
159. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Clause in pertinent part reads: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his [or her]
defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Powell, a pre-incorporation era case, clarified the right to counsel,
but invoked the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Sixth Amendment Right to
Counsel Clause. Id. For an excellent historical analysis of incorporation, see DAVID J. BODENHAMER,
FAIR TRIAL: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN AMERICAN HISTORY 92-128 (1992).
160. Powell, 287 U.S. at 57 (emphasis added).
161. Id. at 59 (citing Commonwealth v. O'Keefe, 148 A. 73, 74 (Pa. 1929)).
162. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
163. Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the decision. Id. at 716.
164. Id. at 714.
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defendants' right of compulsory process.'65 Moreover, although the Court
described the Sixth Amendment as conferring certain rights to "every
defendant in a criminal trial,'"66 Nixon involved a subpoena for production
"before trial."'67 The Court observed that the subpoenaed materials were not
otherwise available to the special prosecutor and their "examination and
processing" could not await trial.'"6
In Nixon,'69 the Supreme Court relied on United States v. Burr.70 In
Burr, the defendant was charged with treason and accused of planning to
precipitate war with Spain and establish a separate government in the western
states by force. 17' In an 1807 address to Congress, President Thomas
Jefferson identified the defendant as the mastermind of this plot, and in so
doing referred to a certain letter sent to him by General James Wilkinson.""
The defendant sought the letter pretrial. 7 3 The court rejected the Govern-
ment's argument that Burr's motion for a subpoena duces tecum was
premature because the Sixth Amendment rights were trial rights. 74 Instead,
the court held that a defendant's right of compulsory process attaches as soon
as the defendant has an interest in preparing his defense, and that in Burr's
case, this occurred upon his arrest.175 In ordering President Jefferson to
produce the letter for the trial court's inspection, the court in Burr, as in
Nixon, derived a pretrial production right from the Compulsory Process
Clause. 76 Burr is particularly relevant because it represents a "contemporary
construction of the clause by the preeminent constitutional jurist of the
time,"177 Chief Justice John Marshall.
Thus, significant authority exists to show that the Compulsory Process
Clause includes at least certain discovery rights, and contextualizing the
Compulsory Process Clause within the Sixth Amendment only supports this
notion. Indeed, Powell v. Alabama is an important authority in this area not
only because it recognizes Sixth Amendment rights as sometimes being more
than trial rights, 7 but also because it clarifies the right to counsel, one of
the Sixth Amendment rights. 79 The Court observed that the Framers
165. See id. at 711. Strangely, in Nixon the Court relied on the Sixth Amendment even though the
prosecution, and not the defendants, sought the pretrial production of the tapes.
166. Id. (emphasis added).
167. Id. at 702 (emphasis in original).
168. Id.
169. See id. at 702, 707, 708, 713, 714-15.
170. 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d).
171. FRANcis F. BEHNE, SHOUT TREASON: THE TRIAL OF AARON BuRR 19, 174-75 (1959).
172. See id. at 25-26. If Aaron Burr was the mastermind of the plot, General Wilkinson was, at least
originally, a co-conspirator. Id. at 21, 36-38, 253. Wilkinson ultimately betrayed Burr by sending letters
to President Jefferson exposing the plot. Id. at 112.
173. Id. at 93. In the letter which was the subject of the subpoena duces tecum, Wilkinson falsely
professed ignorance of the plot's details. Id. at 112-13.
174. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 32-33.
175. Id. at 33.
176. See id.
177. Westen, supra note 2, at 102.
178. See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
179. Powell, 287 U.S. 45, 52 (1932).
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envisioned defense counsel as concerned not only with matters of law, but
with matters of fact,' and it acknowledged defense counsel's "vitally
important" role in fact investigation.' The Court's observation about
defense counsel's role remains poignant. As Professor Fletcher has observed:
"The most imaginative formulation of legal points and intensive research is
utterly useless in trial if the creative thinking and research have been directed
to a misconceived range of evidentiary detail."'8 2 Accordingly, it is well-
settled that the right to counsel embraces the right to have the assistance of
counsel for purposes of developing the evidence.'
8 3
Defense counsel's role in fact-gathering is particularly important and more
difficult today than it was when the Bill of Rights was ratified. In United
States v. Wade," 4 which involved the defendant's right to counsel at a
pretrial, post-indictment, live lineup, the Supreme Court noted that "[w]hen
the Bill of Rights was adopted, there were no organized police forces as we
know them today. The accused confronted the prosecutor and the witnesses
against him, and the evidence was marshalled, largely at the trial itself."'8 5
Today's defense counsel must meet the prosecutor's particularly formidable
and unprecedented arsenal of fact-gathering methods, including the use of an
organized police force to marshal the evidence prior to trial. Moreover, it
cannot be seriously argued that defense counsel's task is any less onerous
because an organized police force investigates the charges. Professor Stanley
Fisher has documented a pro-prosecution bias in police investigation and
reporting. 8 He has observed that despite "formal departmental policies
requiring 'complete' investigations and reports of 'all relevant facts,' many,
if not most, police follow 'working rules' that prefer minimal investigations
and reports limited to inculpatory facts.' 87 Professor Fisher's research
included an examination of police training materials and concluded:
[N]one of the training materials addresses the importance of investigating,
recording, or reporting exculpatory facts to avoid punishment of a possibly
innocent arrestee. On the contrary, the materials reflect a psychological set
in which the arrestee's guilt is presumed, and the only use of notes and
reports in the criminal process is to ensure conviction. 88
180. Id. at 60-65 (reviewing the history of the right to counsel in colonial America); see also 2
ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 399 (Amo Press 1972)
(1796) (emphasizing the importance of defense counsel's fact investigation to truth-seeking at trial).
181. Powell, 287 U.S. at 57.
182. Fletcher, supra note 77, at 305.
183. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION
AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 181 (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE].
184. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
185. Id. at 224 (citing Note, An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police
Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1040-42 (1964), and Richard Jaeger, Comment, The Right to Counsel
During Police Interrogation, 53 CAL. L. REv. 337, 347-48 (1965) (both discussing the pretrial
interrogation of criminal defendants by the police, for the proposition that organized police forces post-
date the Bill of Rights)); see also BODENHAMER, supra note 159, at 84 (tracing the development of a
professional police force to the 1920's).
186. See generally Stanley Z. Fisher, "Just the Facts, Ma'am": Lying and the Omission of
Exculpatory Evidence in Police Reports, 28 NEW ENG. L. REv. 1 (1993).
187. Id. at 18.
188. Id. at 30.
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Professor Fisher also concluded, rather cynically, that "if the police do not
conduct an objective, neutral, and thorough investigation, no one [apparently
including defense counsel] will."' 89 He therefore recommended several
remedies for the failure of police to report exculpatory evidence.9 0
Whether or not one agrees with Professor Fisher's conclusion that charges
are inadequately investigated by all the players in a criminal prosecution, it
is apparent from his research that today's defense counsel faces significant
challenges in the effort to gather evidence and mount a defense. Wade
implicitly acknowledged that with the advent of the modem police force,
defense counsel's role had to evolve to meet the changed circumstances of
modern fact investigation. It is also apparent that the defendant's right to
obtain witnesses in his or her favor must work in tandem with this modem
right to counsel. 9'
B. Westen 's Unwieldy Approach to Compulsory Process
Clause Discovery Rights
Although the Supreme Court has interpreted the Compulsory Process Clause
as embracing discovery rights and the right to counsel as assuring defendants'
counsel for purposes of fact investigation, it has dismissed the notion of a
general constitutional right to discovery in criminal cases, and instead has
applied a due process analysis on a case by case basis. 92 In Brady v.
Maryland,93 one of the seminal cases on the subject, the Court held that
due process required the government to reveal material evidence in its
possession favoring the accused. 194 In Brady, the prosecution in a murder
trial violated the defendant's due process rights when it failed to produce a
co-participant's confession that he had strangled the victim in the perpetration
of a robbery. 95 The Court reasoned that a failure to reveal exculpatory
evidence "casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding that
does not comport with standards of justice."'96 The Court insisted that the
189. Id. at 57. Although Professor Fisher insinuates that defense counsel will not conduct thorough
investigations, the empirical evidence suggests otherwise. See E. Allan Lind et al., Discovery and
Presentation of Evidence in Adversary and Nonadversary Proceedings, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1129, 1141,
1143 (1973) (providing empirical evidence that partisan advocacy results in a more thorough
investigation on behalf of the underdog litigant). Perhaps his point is that defense counsel may not have
the resources to conduct the sort of thorough investigation that a case merits. But this point argues only
for "insuring that adequate resources be made available to all litigants." THIBAUT & WALKER, supra
note 40, at 119. The empirical evidence certainly supports the conclusion that prosecutors presented with
evidence favoring conviction (such as that which might be gathered by the police) are unlikely to pursue
further investigation. See Lind et al., supra, at 1141.
190. Fisher, supra note 186, at 40-54 (discussing tort remedies, equitable relief, and administrative
reform).
191. Although Joseph Story did not connect the right to counsel with fact investigation as Zephaniah
Swift did, see supra note 180 and accompanying text, Story did recognize that the rights to compulsory
process and counsel worked in tandem. See STORY, supra note 124, § 1786, at 662-63.
192. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977).
193. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
194. Id. at 87.
195. Id. at 84.
196. Id. at 88.
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guiding principle in its decision was fairness to the accused; 9 7 the charac-
terization of the prosecutor's failure to disclose as either negligent or willful
was irrelevant. 9' If there was a reasonable probability that disclosure of the
government's information would have changed the result, the conviction had
to be reversed.' 99
In the wake of United States v. Nixon,"' Professor Westen predicted that
the Court would turn to the Compulsory Process Clause to resolve a broad
spectrum of discovery problems, including the Brady problem (when the
prosecutor fails to disclose evidence favorable to the accused and material to
guilt or punishment),2 ' and the type of discovery problems raised by this
Article (the problem of interviewing recalcitrant witnesses"2 and the
problem of the prosecutor using hearsay evidence in lieu of live testi-
mony).2"3 Although Nixon renewed the Burr understanding of the Compulsory
Process Clause, time has not borne out Professor Westen's prediction that the
Court would turn to the Clause to resolve even Brady-type discovery
problems. His prediction failed because he offered no coherent, workable
theory for the application of the Compulsory Process Clause to the assortment
of discovery problems. Instead, he advanced only the broadest notion that the
Compulsory Process Clause served to protect the defendant from being
"deprived of information that may refute the state's case or affirmatively
prove the case in his favor,"2 4 a notion which would prove to be too
197. Id. at 87.
198. See id.
199. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (clarifying Brady's materiality
requirement).
200. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
201. Westen, supra note 2, at 121-26.
202. Id. at 128-29.
203. Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 17, at 624. Professor Westen
argued that the State should be constitutionally required to give the defendant advance notice of the
intent to use hearsay evidence in lieu of live testimony. Id. A notice requirement would be a major
advance in criminal procedure. However, many jurisdictions, including the federal courts, do not even
require the prosecution to provide a list of the witnesses that it intends to call at trial. See, e.g., United
States v. Holland, 884 F.2d 354, 357 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that Rule 16 does not require disclosure
of prospective witnesses, including experts); United States v. Taylor, 707 F. Supp. 696, 702-03
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (ruling that a witness list is not discoverable). Indeed, in 1974, Congress rejected a
proposed rule to require discovery of witness lists. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 70, § 20.3(h), at 852;
see also GRAHAM, supra note 79, at 35-56 (recounting the history of efforts to require the prosecution
to furnish the defense with the names, addresses, and statements of the government's trial witnesses, and
identifying a split of sentiment between commentators, drafters of model statutes, and state legislatures
on the one hand, and Congress on the other, over such requirements); Brennan, supra note 79, at 6
(describing the Justice Department's opposition to providing witness lists). Also, there is certainly no
requirement that the prosecution provide a list of the hearsay evidence that it will offer at trial.
As argued below, when incriminating or accusatory hearsay will be tendered by the prosecution in
lieu of the declarant's live testimony, the defendant should not only receive advance notice, but the
admission of such prosecution evidence should be predicated on the defense's opportunity to interview
or depose the declarant. See infra notes 244-48 and accompanying text. This argument is not based on
any general notion that the defendant is being deprived of information that may refute the State's case
or affirmatively prove the case in his favor, but rather because the declarant possesses material, personal
knowledge of the events in issue, and there is no other way to assess the declarant's value as a defense
witness at trial and effect the "checking" function of the Compulsory Process Clause.
204. Westen, supra note 2, at 175 (applying the Compulsory Process Clause to yet another discovery
problem: the "lost evidence" cases).
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sweeping and unwieldy for the Court to adopt. Indeed, as recently as 1987,
in Pennsylvania V. Ritchie,"' the Court declined to apply the Compulsory
Process Clause to a discovery dispute." 6 The Court relied instead on the
Due Process Clause, and noted that in any event the Compulsory Process
Clause offered the defendant no greater rights than the Due Process Clause
under the circumstances. 0 7
Although Professor Westen has argued that the Supreme Court has relied on
due process in resolving discovery disputes when compulsory process would
have served better, there is good reason to treat some discovery disputes as
due process problems and to classify others as compulsory process problems.
Rather than rewrite the Court's discovery jurisprudence, as Professor Westen's
view would require, this Article uses the Court's criminal discovery decisions
as authoritative statements of constitutional policy and attempts to rationalize
and reconcile them. The analysis offers a framework that is more consonant
with the Court's precedents to date and delineates a less diffuse right to
pretrial discovery under the Compulsory Process Clause.08
C. A New, More Limited Approach to Compulsory Process
Clause Discovery Rights
Is there a principled distinction between Nixon and Burr, recognizing the
applicability of the Compulsory Process Clause to pretrial discovery questions,
and the Brady-Ritchie line of cases, applying the Due Process Clause? Yes,
and that distinction ultimately turns on maintaining the adversarial nature of
the proceedings.
In Ritchie, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded that the trial court
had violated both the Confrontation Clause and the Compulsory Process
Clause by refusing to order disclosure of the state's protective services file
to the defense. 0 9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and found that
neither clause had been violated."' 0 It found no violation of the Compulsory
Process Clause because the contours of compulsory process are "unsettled"
and due process provided a "clear framework." '' Citing Brady, the Court
concluded that due process required the trial court to review the file for
information that was favorable to the accused and material to guilt or
punishment.2 '2
205. 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
206. See id. at 56.
207. Id.
208. Professor Louisell, who was at the forefront of the debate on expanding criminal discovery,
observed that "in the area of criminal discovery as elsewhere, we must struggle for norms that are
objectively identifiable, observable, and reasonable." Louisell, supra note 78, at 98. This Article attempts
to do just that.
209. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 46.
210. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text regarding the Supreme Court's rejection of the
defendant's Confrontation Clause claim.
211. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56.
212. Id. at 57. The Court further observed that "[e]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable
probability that ... [if] disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would [be] different."' Id.
(quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).
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Interestingly, in declining to apply the Compulsory Process Clause, the
Court acknowledged the analysis of Chief Justice Marshall in Burr as the
"first and most celebrated analysis" of the Clause; 2 3 it recognized Professor
Westen's "excellent" summary of the Burr case and its implications for
compulsory process;21 4 and it described Washington v. Texas as establishing
the "minimum" rights protected by the Clause. 2 5 These acknowledgments
suggest that the Court would be receptive to grounding at least some
discovery rights in the Compulsory Process Clause. The Court, however, also
observed, rather cryptically, that it had "never squarely held that the
Compulsory Process Clause guarantee[d] the right to discover the identity of
witnesses, or to require the government to produce exculpatory evidence, 21 6
the precise information sought by the defendant in Ritchie.
What sort of discovery rights might be grounded in the Compulsory Process
Clause? In Ritchie, as in Brady, the defendant sought material prepared by the
State, the product of the State's investigatory work. In Ritchie, the defendant
sought access to the file of the protective services agency investigating his
daughter's alleged abuse. In Brady, the defendant sought the extrajudicial
statements of his partner in crime, Boblit, who apparently had made several
statements to the police. In sharp contrast, both the tape recorded conversa-
tions sought in Nixon and the letter sought in Burr were raw evidence, not the
product of a formal government investigation, but the product of the very
circumstances in issue. Nixon involved tapes of President Nixon's personal
conversations with the Watergate defendants, and Burr involved General
Wilkinson's self-serving letter to President Thomas Jefferson. Neither was the
fruit of a government criminal investigation.1 7
This important distinction suggests that the Compulsory Process Clause
appropriately governs a criminal defendant's access to the raw evidence, but
not to the product of the government's fact-gathering efforts.1 5 It would
follow that the raw evidence collected by the prosecution would also be
subject to disclosure, since the prosecution's collection of the evidence would
not transform its nature. Thus, the relevant statements of witnesses, made and
recorded separate and apart from a government criminal investigation, like the
213. Id. at 55.
214. Id. at55 n.ll.
215. Id. at 56 n.13.
216. Id. at 56 (emphasis in original). The Ritchie Court cited Nixon using a "[b]ut cf." signal, a signAl
indicating contradiction. See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 23 (15th ed. 1991).
217. Valenzuela-Bernal, which also acknowledged that the Compulsory Process Clause may require
pretrial discovery, similarly addressed the defense interrogation of eyewitnesses to the alleged crime and
not the defense discovery of any government-generated witness statements. See discussion supra at note
67.
218. Although the notion of raw evidence set forth here is derived from the Court's criminal
discovery and Compulsory Process Clause jurisprudence, distinguishing it from the product of a formal
government investigation brings to mind the attorney work-product doctrine and similarly reflects an
adversarial ideology. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947) (discussing the purpose of
the work-product doctrine); see also Sherman L. Cohn, The Work-Product Doctrine: Protection, Not
Privilege, 71 GEO. L.J. 917, 943 (1983). Nevertheless, there are important differences between the
theory of Compulsory Process Clause discovery rights advanced here and the work-product doctrine.
The former creates discovery opportunities which otherwise would not exist. The work-product doctrine
is a restriction upon existing discovery opportunities. Id. at 922 (discussing FED. P. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)).
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tape-recorded conversations in Nixon and the letter in Burr, would be subject
to a Compulsory Process Clause analysis. The same would be true for eyewit-
nesses with relevant, personal knowledge, such as incriminating or accusatory
hearsay declarants, and real evidence, such as hair fibers and blood samples.
However, witness statements given to or recorded by a government agent, like
the confession in Brady, or the State's analysis of real evidence, like the
reports of its forensic experts, would be subject to a due process analysis.
Drawing a line here makes sense. The Supreme Court has recognized the
constitutionalization of an adversary system,1 9 and that the Framers
equipped the defendant with the various weapons of warfare: counsel,
confrontation, and compulsory process. 220 To be sure, the playing field was
not meant to be level. The burden of proof was meant to lie decisively on the
221shoulders of the prosecution. Even so, the Framers empowered the
defense and equipped the defendant for battle.222 The defendant could
choose to do nothing and simply point to the prosecution's failure of
proof,2 3 but the defendant retained the choice and in that lay some measure
of power.
219. Nevertheless, scholars disagree over the historical significance of the Sixth Amendment rights.
Compare Jonakait, supra note 142, at 738-43 (examining the English common-law trial and arguing that
rights to counsel, confrontation, and compulsory process evolved not to balance an adversary, but "as
a check on the authority of judges to control the information that the jury can consider") with Clinton,
supra note 122, at 720 (observing that "[t]he turn of the eighteenth century saw a rapid expansion of
defendants' rights and a rapid movement toward a trial mechanism more evenly balanced between the
Crown and the accused"); see also LANDSMAN, supra note 75, at 47-48 (defending the constitutional
status of adversarial procedure).
220. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408-10 (1988).
221. Although the formulaic burden of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" does not appear to have
crystallized until as late as 1798, "[tjhe 'demand for a higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases was
recurrently expressed from ancient times."' In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (quoting CHARLES
T. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 321, at 681-82 (1954)).
222. See LANDSMAN, supra note 75, at 26-28 (noting that in the 18th and 19th centuries, the
emphasis in criminal procedure evolved from one of protecting the defendant by placing a heavy burden
on the state to one of allowing the defendant to take a more active part in the proceedings). Bodenhamer
has observed the revolutionary legacy that "[c]learly, something was happening to expand previous
conceptions of rights of the accused." BODENHAMER, supra note 159, at 39. He describes the right to
counsel as "a striking example of how far the founders were willing to advance indivdual [sic] rights,"
since in "[b]oth Great Britain and the colonies a person charged with a felony had no right at common
law to the advice or representation of counsel." Id. at 39-40. Professor Heller has similarly argued that
although the right to compulsory process was not known at English common law and was a relatively
new creature of English statutory law, the Framers saw fit to include it in the Bill of Rights. FRANCIS
H. HELLER, THE SIX= AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 106-07 (1951).
223. As Justice Black observed:
The defendant, under our Constitution, need not do anything at all to defend himself ....
Rather he has an absolute, unqualified right to compel the State to investigate its own case,
find its own witnesses, prove its own facts, and convince the jury through its own resources.
Throughout the process the defendant has a fundamental right to remain silent, in effect
challenging the State at every point to: "Prove it!"
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 112 (1970) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Professor Goldstein, however, has rejected the notion that criminal defendants have a meaningful option
to remain passive in a prosecution. Instead, he has observed that "[i]ncreased reliance upon the trial as
the principal device for protecting the accused makes it imperative that the defense come to trial as well
equipped as the prosecution to raise 'doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve' men [or women] in
the jury box." Goldstein, supra note 69, at 1172 (quoting United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649
(S.D.N.Y. 1923)).
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Indeed, the Court's criminal discovery jurisprudence reveals two "seemingly
incompatible" objectives: adversarial proceedings and justice (as opposed to
convictions).224 The Court has observed that "[t]he adversary system of trial
is hardly an end in itself; it is not yet a poker game in which players enjoy
an absolute right always to conceal their cards until played." '225 However,
the Court has also commented that adversarial proceedings are instrumental
to truth-seeking at trial. This idea is captured in United States v. Cronic:226
.'The very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan
advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that
the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free."'2 27 Accordingly, the Court
disfavors incursions into the adversariness of proceedings unless a failure to
allow the incursion will result in a miscarriage of justice, A la Brady. The
Court has repeatedly rejected the idea that the prosecution, as the defendant's
adversary, must disclose its files to the defense,228 but requires disclosure
when there is a reasonable probability that the revelation of the information
would change the result of the proceeding,229 undermining truth-seeking at
224. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 696 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
225. Williams, 399 U.S. at 82 (approving a statutory notice-of-alibi provision requiring the defense
to provide specific pretrial discovery to the prosecution). Nevertheless, the Court's strongest statements
about the trial not being a sporting contest come in the context of interpreting the constitutionality of
statutes requiring pretrial defense disclosures, and the strongest statements about the centrality of
adversariness come in the context of constitutional challenges to a prosecutor's failure to make pretrial
disclosures. Cf. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 n.6 (disapproving of the prosecutor's failure to disclose
evidence that could have been used to impeach the government's witnesses, but describing Brady as a
"limited departure from a pure adversary model") (emphasis added). Indeed, it appears too easy for the
Court to hide behind the diverging analyses it applies to what the Constitution allows (state laws
compelling reciprocal discovery) and what it requires (an obligation to disclose prosecution files in only
limited circumstances), but a pro-prosecution bias does appear.
226. 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (discussing the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of
counsel).
227. Id. at 655 (quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)). At issue is the
"psychology of decision making." GEOFFREY, C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 121
(1978). Professor Hazard observes that a theory of adversarial adjudication is based in part on the idea
that "it is better to have conflicting preliminary hypotheses and supporting proofs presented by the
parties so that the judge's mind can be kept open until all the evidence is at hand." Id.; see also Lon
L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 44 (Harold J. Berman ed., 2d ed. 1971)
(similarly observing that "' [an adversary presentation seems the only effective means for combating
th[e] human tendency to judge too swiftly") (quoting an ABA committee). Indeed, there is empirical
evidence that an adversary presentation counteracts decision-maker bias. See THIBAUT & WALKER, supra
note 40, at 41-52; John Thibaut et al., Comment, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal
Decisionmaking, 86 HARV. L. REV. 386, 391-401 (1972); see also Lind et al., supra note 189, at 1140-
43 (providing empirical evidence that partisan advocacy results in more thorough investigation for the
underdog litigant).
228. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59 (1987) ("A defendant's right to discover exculpatory
evidence does not include the unsupervised authority to search through the Commonwealth's files.");
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111 (1976) (rejecting the idea that "the prosecutor has a
constitutional duty routinely to deliver his entire file to defense counsel"); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S.
786, 795 (1972) (noting that there is "no constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a
complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a case").
Furthermore, Congress agrees. Thus, in Palermo v. United States, the Court described the legislature's
concern for adversarial proceedings and independent preparation as undergirding the enactment of the
Jencks Act, legislation which limits a defendant's access to recorded witness statements. 360 U.S. 343,
350 (1959).
229. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57 (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).
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trial. Moreover, while the Court has upheld statutory requirements that the
defense disclose certain information prior to trial, it has sustained such
statutes only to the extent that the prosecution had a concomitant obligation
to disclose; that is, only to the extent that the balanced adversariness of the
proceedings was maintained by reciprocal discovery obligations."'
Given this notion of defense empowerment in the framework of an
adversary system, it makes sense that the Compulsory Process Clause would
entitle the defendant to obtain the raw evidence, but not the product of the
prosecution's investigative efforts. Writing before the availability of the
principal cases discussed here, and without suggesting a constitutional basis
for his argument, Professor Fletcher made the following similar observation:
[W]e must assume that there is merit in our adversary system-that the
truth in the adjudication of disputes, civil or criminal, will best appear if
we leave fact gathering to the litigants themselves. Following this
assumption, we ought logically to give both sides an equal opportunity to
reach the raw material and to let each make of it what he can.23'
When the defense seeks the product of the prosecution's investigative efforts,
however, the Court appropriately applies a distinct analysis, emphasizing the
prosecution's limited constitutional obligation to deliver this sort of informa-
tion. While criminal defendants could only stand to gain from access to these
materials (as the State's investigatory resources far exceed those of most
criminal defendants),232 the Framers did not structure a system in which the
defendant would be dependent upon the prosecution for defense evidence.
Instead, the Framers gave defendants the affirmative right to obtain the raw
evidence for purposes of mounting a defense; they armed an adversary.
Discovery claims based on the Compulsory Process Clause are not
appropriately based on a theory that the prosecution has the information and
therefore the defense should as well (a fairness argument limited to the
requirements of the Due Process Clause). In Washington v. Texas,233 the
Court's decision did not turn, as concurring Justice Harlan proposed, on the
fact that the Texas statutes allowed the prosecution to call the defendant's
alleged accomplice as a witness while the defendant could not (a fairness
argument), 234 but instead turned on the defendant's distinct and independent
right of compulsory process to obtain witnesses in his or her favor (the
230. Compare Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (upholding a notice-of-alibi rule with a
reciprocity provision) with Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973) (holding that a notice-of-alibi rule
without a reciprocity provision violates the Due Process Clause).
231. Fletcher, supra note 77, at 305. Justice Traynor similarly observed that the notion of the
adversary system as a truth-seeking device "is hardly realistic unless the evidence is accessible in
advance to the adversaries so that each can prepare accordingly in the light of such evidence." Traynor,
supra note 77, at 228.
232. See Wardius, 412 U.S. at 475 n.9.
233. 388 U.S. 14 (1967); see also supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text (describing the Court's
decision).
234. Washington, 388 U.S. at 24-25 (Harlan, J., concurring). But see Welsh S. White, Evidentiary
Privileges and the Defendant's Constitutional Right to Introduce Evidence, 80 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 377, 392-93, 401-04 (1989) (suggesting that "evenhandedness" is fundamental to a
Compulsory Process Clause analysis).
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defendant-as-adversary model) and the State's arbitrary denial of that
right.23 5 Discovery claims based on the Compulsory Process Clause are,
therefore, appropriately based on a theory that the defendant-as-adversary
seeks to marshal and evaluate the raw evidence in order to check the
prosecution's presentation of the evidence and counter the charges.
Identifying the distinct objectives of the Clauses is important. In a subgroup
of the so-called "access to evidence" cases, more appropriately called the "lost
evidence" cases, the Court has applied a due process analysis to cases
involving raw evidence.23 6 Even when the Court has applied both the Due
Process Clause and the Compulsory Process Clause, the Court's Compulsory
Process Clause analysis has "borrowed" heavily from the Court's due process
jurisprudence,237 including Brady and its progeny.238 The problem is that,
rather than develop its Compulsory Process Clause jurisprudence, the Court
has applied due process standards that fail to acknowledge the particular
interests at stake. In the lost evidence cases, the Court is concerned about
prosecutions being dismissed because of lost evidence, the value of which is
uncertain, 239 and has responded by focusing on the fairness of the pro-
ceedings.24 ' The Compulsory Process Clause is only secondarily concerned
about fairness, however. The Clause is primarily concerned about effecting the
defendant-as-adversary model by protecting the defendant's interest in
presenting "witnesses in his [or her] favor." It may be that a prosecution in
which the defendant was unable to test lost physical evidence was fair
because the prosecution did not use the lost evidence against the defen-
dant,24" ' or because the defendant was able to cross-examine the State's
witness who did test the evidence.242 But the Compulsory Process Clause
allows the defendant to present "witnesses in [the defendant's] favor," even
when fundamental fairness may not require it. Accordingly, it is important not
to confuse the purpose of the specific Sixth Amendment clause with the more
amorphous rights protected by the Due Process Clause. 243 As the following
sections demonstrate, using the correct framework can make a difference.
235. Washington, 388 U.S. at 22-23.
236. See, e.g., Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (state failed to preserve semen samples);
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) (state failed to preserve breath sample); United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982) (government deported eyewitnesses).
237. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 872.
238. Id. at 868-69.
239. See, e.g., Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57-58; Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 486.
240. See Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 485.
241. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56.
242. See Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 490.
243. Professor Jonakait similarly has argued that the Court has confused the purpose of evidence law,
which is to ensure the reliability of the proceedings, with the true but displaced purpose of the
Confrontation Clause, which is to work in conjunction with the other Sixth Amendment rights to
constitutionalize adversary proceedings. Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to
the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 581-86 (1988).
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D. The Utility of the New Approach in Resolving
Criminal Discovery Problems
The Supreme Court's recent Confrontation Clause jurisprudence recognizes
a distinct role for the Compulsory Process Clause in the adversary system of
criminal justice. It suggests that the Compulsory Process Clause functions as
a check against the prosecutor's use and abuse of evidence at trial. Neverthe-
less, the "checking" function of the Compulsory Process Clause cannot hope
to be realized unless the Clause guarantees at least some opportunities for
discovery. Grounding the discovery of raw evidence in the Compulsory
Process Clause is supported by the Court's criminal discovery jurisprudence.
Defense discovery of the raw evidence makes checking the prosecution's
presentation of the evidence realizable.
1. The Inadi/White Problem
Inadi and White assigned the defendant the onus of calling as witnesses
declarants of incriminating and accusatory prosecution hearsay, respec-
tively.244 While the Compulsory Process Clause enables the defendant to
obtain witnesses who are in the broadest sense "in the defendant's favor," '245
counsel cannot call such a declarant as a "witness in the defendant's favor"
unless counsel can intelligently anticipate the declarant's testimony.24 6 When
no opportunity for an interview or confrontation with the prosecution's
hearsay declarant has occurred pretrial or will occur during trial, the purpose
of the Compulsory Process Clause as a check against the prosecution's
presentation of the evidence cannot be achieved without pretrial (or extra-
trial) discovery. Accordingly, the Compulsory Process Clause would prohibit
the admission of the prosecution's hearsay evidence unless the hearsay
declarant voluntarily submitted to a defense interview or deposition.247
244. See supra part II.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 130-32.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 151-62.
247. Some courts have rejected the idea of grounding a right to depose a recalcitrant witness in the
Compulsory Process Clause. See, e.g., State v. Lampp, 155 So. 2d 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963), appeal
dismissed, 166 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 1964); see also Cruz v. State, 737 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987)
(finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to order the victim's deposition pursuant to
statute). But these cases have not involved the prosecution's (proposed) use of incriminating or
accusatory hearsay evidence at trial in lieu of live testimony and the defendant's inability to check the
prosecution's presentation of the evidence by interviewing or deposing the hearsay declarant. Instead,
in these cases, the prosecution presumably presents the witness' live testimony, and the defense is able
to check the prosecution's presentation of the evidence by testing the witness' story on cross-
examination at trial.
Some criminal discovery statutes specifically provide for witness depositions when the witness is
uncooperative. See, e.g., ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 15.3(a)(2) (deposition available upon a showing "that the
person's testimony is material to the case or necessary adequately to prepare a defense or investigate
the offense, that the person was not a witness at the preliminary hearing, and that the person will not
cooperate in granting a personal interview"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-201 (1)(c) (deposition available
"if it appears that a prospective witness.., is unwilling to provide relevant information to a requesting
party"); N.M. DIST. Cr. R. CRIM. P. 5-503(A) (compelling witness statements when witnesses are
uncooperative); see also N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 517:13(11) (deposition available at the court's
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This resolution of the Inadi/White problem not only effects the "checking"
function of the Compulsory Process Clause, but is appropriately deferential
to our adversary system of criminal justice by recognizing a distinction
between Compulsory Process Clause and Due Process Clause discovery rights.
Since the declarant's statements are incriminating or accusatory, the
declarant's knowledge is necessarily relevant and material. Moreover, the
defendant's pursuit of the hearsay declarant's knowledge takes nothing from
the prosecution, since neither party owns the witness. 48 The adversarial
nature of the proceedings is, however, promoted and truth-seeking at trial is
furthered, since the defense can check the prosecutorial use and abuse of
hearsay evidence in lieu of live testimony by accessing the raw evidence-that
is, the hearsay declarant's personal knowledge.
2. The Right to Test and Retest Tangible Objects
The notion of the Compulsory Process Clause as arming an adversary for
a truth-seeking battle and providing the defense with certain pretrial (or extra-
trial) discovery opportunities to check the prosecution's presentation of the
evidence at trial has implications beyond the context in which the prosecutor
uses incriminating or accusatory hearsay evidence in lieu of eyewitness testi-
mony. The Compulsory Process Clause, thus understood, would include a
defense right to test tangible evidence, even when that evidence has been
previously analyzed by prosecution experts. While the scientific analysis
of real evidence in criminal litigation may have been unforeseeable by the
Framers, this sort of evidence has emerged as the mainstay of criminal liti-
gation. 50 Indeed, it is well settled that a defense attorney's duty to
investigate includes seeking the scientific testing of tangible objects .2 1 To
the extent that the Compulsory Process Clause embraces the right to obtain
the raw evidence as a means of checking the prosecution's presentation of the
evidence at trial and to present a defense, it also embraces the right to analyze
tangible objects and present an analysis of the real evidence to the jury.
Undoubtedly, tangible objects are embraced by the term "witnesses" in the
Compulsory Process Clause. In Washington v. Texas, the Court identified the
essence of the Compulsory Process Clause as "the right to present a defense,
discretion, having considered, among other things, the availability of other opportunities to discover the
information sought by the deposition). In any event, the Compulsory Process Clause would not give the
defendant a right to depose the hearsay declarant but would disallow the prosecution's hearsay evidence
without a defense interview or deposition.
248. See Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 865
(1969).
249. Professor Giannelli has argued for statutory reform allowing for this sort of discovery. See
Giannelli, supra note 94, at 816-19; see also Louisell, supra note 77, at 936 (recognizing the need for
expanded defense discovery when scientific evidence is at issue).
250. See Giannelli, supra note 94, at 792-93 (discussing the prominent role of physical evidence and
scientific proof in criminal cases); see also Traynor, supra note 77, at 249 (recognizing the "advantage
of scientific aids" in modem prosecutions).
251. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE, supra note 183, § 4-4.1 commentary at 182.
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the right to present the defendant's version of the facts," '252 and there would
appear to be no good reason to limit that right to people-witnesses. In Burr,
the Government argued that the "process" due under the Sixth Amendment
extended only to "witnesses" for the defense, and not to their papers,25 but
Marshall rejected the "literal distinction" as "too much attenuated to be
countenanced in the tribunals of a just and humane nation. 254 Instead, he
construed the Clause in light of its purpose-to enable the defendant to
present evidence-and concluded that it must include papers.
Scientific testing of relevant, tangible objects can be critical in demonstra-
ting the defendant's innocence.256 Nevertheless, while most state criminal
discovery statutes allow the defendant to inspect tangible evidence in the
government's possession,2 57 and the right to test this evidence has been
252. Washington, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
253. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34-35 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14692d).
254. Id. at 35.
255. Id.
256. In a recent Maryland case, a man who had endured two criminal trials, and nine years in state
prison (two of which were on death row), was released when DNA analysis of the semen found on the
rape victim's underwear eliminated the possibility that this man had raped the child-victim. Speculation
followed that many more of the wrongly convicted would turn to DNA analysis of real evidence to
demonstrate their innocence. The wrongly charged would certainly want to do the same.
257. See, e.g., ALA. R. CRiM. P. 16.1(c); Aiuz. R. CRIM. P. 15.1(a)(4) ("[a] list of... tangible
objects which the prosecutor will use at trial or which were obtained from or purportedly belong to the
defendant") (emphasis added); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-89-116(b) (Michie 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 1054.1(c) (West Supp. 1994); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 16, pt. I(a)(1)(IV); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 54-86a (West 1985 & West 1994); DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 16(a)(1)(C); FLA. R. CRIM. P.
3.220(b)(F),(K) (the prosecuting attorney "shall disclose to defense counsel... any tangible... objects
that the prosecuting attorney intends to use in the hearing or trial or which were obtained from or belong
to the accused;... that the prosecuting attorney intends to use in the hearing or trial and that were not
obtained from or that did not belong to the accused"); IDAHO CODE § 19-1309(2) (1987); IDAHO CRIM.
IR 16(b)(4); ILL. Sup. CT. IL 412(a)(v) ("which the prosecuting attorney intends to use in the hearing
or trial or which were obtained from or belong to the accused"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2; IOWA R.
CRIM. P. 13(2)(b)(1); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3212(b) (Supp. 1993); Ky. R. CRIM. P. 7.24(2); LA. CODE
CalM. PROC. ANN. art. 718 (West 1981); ME. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(2)(A); MD. R. CRiM. CAUSES 4-
263(b)(5) ("that the State intends to use at the hearing or trial"); MASS. R. CRiM. P. 14(a)(2); MINN. R.
CRIM. P. 9.01 subd. 1(3); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 46-15-322(l)(d) (1993) ("that the prosecutor may use
at trial or that were obtained from or purportedly belong to the defendane'); NEi. REV. STAT. § 29-
1912(l)(f) (1989) ("which could beused as evidence by the prosecuting authority'); NEv. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 174.245 (Michie 1992); N.H. DIST. & MUN. CT. R. 2.10(2) ("a list of any tangible objects
... obtained from or belonging to the defendant") (emphasis added); N.J. R. CRIM. PRAC. 3:13-3(a)(1),
(6); N.M. DIST. CT. I C~iM. P. 5-501(A)(3); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.40(l)(a) (McKinney 1993);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(d) (1988); N.D. R. CRim. P. 16(a)(1)(C); OHIO R CRIM. P. 16(B)(1)(c);
OR. REV. STAT. § 135.815(4)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1994) ("[w]hich the district attorney intends to offer in
evidence at the trial; or [w]hich were obtained from or belong to the defendant"); PA. R. CtiM. P.
305(B)(I)(f); RI. SUPER. CT. R. CIM. P. 16(4) ("which are intended for use by the State as evidence
at the trial or were obtained from or belong to the defendant"); S.C. R. CRIM. P. 5(a)(1)(C); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-13-3 (1988); TENN. R. CalM. P. 16(a)(1)(C); Tx. CODE C~IM. PROC.
ANN. art. 39.14 (West 1979); VT. R. C~iM. P. 16(a)(2)(D); VA. SuP. CT. R. 3A:l l(b)(2); WASH. SUPER.
CT. CRIM. IL 4.7(a)(1)(v) ("which the prosecuting attorney intends to use in the hearing or trial or which
were obtained from or belonged to the defendant"); W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(C); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 971.23(4) (West 1985); WYo. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(C); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(C).
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implied from discovery rules permitting inspection,55 very few statutes
expressly allow the defendant to scientifically test tangible evidence.25 9
Criminal defendants cannot and should not rely on state testing of tangible
objects. The Arkansas Supreme Court recently held that a trial court exceeded
its authority when, at the behest of defendants charged with rape, it ordered
the prosecutor to send the defendants' blood, semen, and saliva samples for
DNA testing. 260 The court observed that the prosecutor's failure to submit
the defendants' samples for DNA testing did not violate the defendants'
federal due process rights because the prosecutor was under no constitutional
obligation to use any particular investigatory tool. 261 While that may be so,
the Framers intended to arm the defendant as an adversary rather than leave
it to the prosecutor alone to develop the evidence.262 An affirmative right,
grounded in the Compulsory Process Clause, to test the raw evidence and
thereby check the prosecution's presentation of the evidence would support
a trial court's order for the funding necessary so that the defendants could test
the samples. 63
258. See, e.g., United States v. Vaughn, 736 F.2d 665, 666 (11th Cir. 1984) (observing that the
defendants "could have obtained their own analysis of the samples," but apparently did not), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1065 (1989); United States v. Gaultney, 606 F.2d 540, 545-46 (5th Cir. 1979)
(observing that "[i]n cases involving a controlled substance, courts have held a concomitant part of the
examination or inspection to be the right of the accused to have an independent chemical analysis
performed on the seized substance," but that the defendants failed to avail themselves of the
opportunity), modified, 615 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Steagald v.
United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981); United States v. Sullivan, 578 F.2d 121, 124 (5th Cir. 1978)
(observing that the right of inspection "includes the right to have an expert examine the narcotics before
trial," but that defense counsel failed to do so); James v. Commonwealth, 482 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1972) (reversing the conviction in part because the court failed to provide the defendant with an
opportunity to have the narcotics inspected and tested by the defendant's chemist); State v. Migliore,
260 So. 2d 682, 689 (La. 1972) (reversing the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to test what
were allegedly cocaine and LSD substances); State v. Cloutier, 302 A.2d 84, 89 (Me. 1973) (finding no
abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to order the release of a sample for independent analysis
since an insufficient quantity of the alleged drug remained to permit adequate and accurate testing or
to preserve its evidentiary use at trial); State v. Gaddis, 530 S.W.2d 64, 69-70 (Tenn. 1975) (vacating
and remanding a conviction for possession of a controlled substance where the trial court denied the
defendant's motion for a sample of the alleged controlled substance in order to have it independently
tested).
259. See, e.g., ALA. R. CRIM. P. 16.1 (c) ("the prosecutor shall.., permit the defendant to analyze,
inspect, and copy"); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(b)(l)(F), (K); ILL. Sup. CT. R. 412(a), (e); IOWA R. CRIM.
P. 13(2)(b)(1); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 718 (West 1981); ME. R. CiuM. P. 16(b)(1); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-1913(1) (1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.23(5) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
260. State v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 872 S.W.2d 414 (Ark. 1994).
261. Id. at 415 (citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988)).
262. Cf. id. (noting that "a defendant cannot rely upon the State's discovery as a substitute for his
or her own investigation").
263. Ake v. Oklahoma recognized the state's obligation to provide an indigent defendant with access
to competent expert assistance and set forth general guidelines for determining when such state aid was
required. 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985). Nevertheless, trial courts are in desperate need of more specific
standards to govem their authorization of funds for defense investigation purposes. See Cade v. State,
No. 92-142, 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 3273, at *2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (finding no abuse of
discretion in the trial court's failure to authorize funds for the appointment of a DNA expert, despite
the fact that the testimony of the state's DNA expert was "crucial to the state's case").
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Even when the state does test the tangible evidence, the defendant should
be entitled to independent testing. As the Supreme Court of Tennessee
obsergfed in State v. Gaddis:
264
It is no answer to say that the State's toxicologist, or other official,
will make a competent and accurate analysis and make the result available
to the defendant. This imputes to these examiners an aura of official
infallibility inconsistent with the processes of the adversary system ....
We reject this approach.265
In a separate case in which the defendant sought access to the alleged murder
weapon and bullet for purposes of having the items examined and tested by
a ballistics expert of his own choosing, the court described the issue as "not
one of discovery but rather the defendant's right to the means necessary to
conduct his defense." 2 s These cases intimate that defense testing minimizes
the possibility that falsified and otherwise erroneous results will go unchal-
lenged.267
While most courts find that a denial of the right to retest is a violation of
fundamental fairness, 26 8 recent cases do exist that refuse to recognize a
264. 530 S.W.2d 64 (Tenn. 1975) (vacating a conviction for possession of marijuana and remanding
the case to the trial court to allow for independent testing by the defense).
265. Id. at 68; see also Warren v. State, 288 So. 2d 826, 830 (Ala. 1973) ("[lIt is no answer to the
question that the State's expert witness is a skillful scientist and a creditable witness.").
266. Barnard v. Henderson, 514 F.2d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1975).
267. A matter of scandalous proportions proves the point. It was recently discovered that Fred Zain,
a state forensic expert, falsified lab work in hundreds of cases in West Virginia and, after relocating to
Texas. See Andrew Schneider, Forensic Lies May Have Jailed Hundreds, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.
(Afternoon Edition), Apr. 18, 1994, at Al. An investigation by Vest Virginia authorities revealed the
following acts of misconduct on the part of Zain:
"(1) overstating the strength of results; (2) overstating the frequency of genetic matches on
individual pieces of evidence; (3) misreporting the frequency of genetic matches on multiple
pieces of evidence; (4) reporting that multiple items had been tested, when only a single item
had been tested; (5) reporting inconclusive results as conclusive; ... (8) failing to report
conflicting results; (9) failing to conduct or to report conducting additional testing to resolve
conflicting results; (10) implying a match with a suspect when testing supported only a match
with the victim; and (11) reporting scientifically impossible or improbable results."
In re West Virginia State Police Crime Lab., 438 S.E.2d 501, 503 (W. Va. 1993) (quoting an
investigative report). Zain was later described as being "completely pro-prosecution ... obsessed by
being a hero to these guys [prosecutors] and other cops." Schneider, supra, at A1S.
Of course, a bigger problem than the systematic falsification of lab results is the problem of
inadvertent errors. Indeed, Vest Virginia authorities investigating Zain's misconduct noted several basic
deficiencies in the operating procedures of the state crime lab:
"(1) no written documentation of testing methodology; (2) no written quality assurance
program; (3) no written internal or external auditing procedures; (4) no routine proficiency
testing of laboratory technicians; (5) no technical review of work product; (6) no written
documentation of instrument maintenance and calibration; (7) no written testing procedures
manual; (8) failure to follow generally-accepted scientific testing standards with respect to
certain tests; (9) inadequate record-keeping; and (10) failure to conduct collateral testing."
In re West Virginia State Police Crime Lab., 438 S.E.2d at 504 (quoting an investigative report). One
or more of these deficiencies could readily contribute to incorrect findings from lab testing. For a
discussion of the reasons for and prevalence of incorrect findings from scientific testing by state
laboratories, see Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Laboratory Reports in Criminal Trials: The
Reliability of Scienti.fic Proof, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 681-82, 688-92 (1988); see also I GIANNELLI &
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 106, § 3-4, at 86 (noting the fallibility of state crime labs).
268. Barnard v. Henderson, 514 F.2d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1975) (stating that "[f]undamental fairness
is violated when a criminal defendant... is denied the opportunity to have an expert of his choosing
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defendant's right to retest and point instead to a defendant's ability to cross-
examine the prosecution's expert. 269 The scenario is all too reminiscent of
the defendant who is unaple to test the declarant of prosecution hearsay
evidence, but is able to cross-examine the witness reporting the declarant's
out-of-court statement. In both cases the defendant is unable to access and
assess the raw evidence.
A Compulsory Process Clause analysis better addresses the specific interests
at stake: adversariness and truth-seeking. The defendant's analysis of the
tangible raw evidence takes nothing from the prosecution and actually
promotes the adversarial nature of the proceedings. Even if the tangible
evidence is in the prosecution's possession, the prosecution does not create
or own (in the Gregory sense) the tangible evidence.2 0 Rather, the defen-
dant-as-adversary seeks only an independent assessment of the raw evidence
as a check against the prosecution's presentation of the evidence. 27' Defense
testing also advances truth-seeking at trial because it indirectly insures the
honesty and reliability of state testing.
3. The Right to Obtain Psychological or Physical Examination
of a Complainant or Witness
The Compulsory Process Clause, understood as a check against the
prosecution's presentation of the evidence and as embodying limited discovery
rights to effect that "checking" function, would also include a defendant's
.. examine a piece of critical evidence whose nature is subject to varying expert opinion"); accord
White v. Maggio, 556 F.2d 1352, 1357 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that denying the defendant access to
tangible evidence violates fundamental fairness when the evidence is both "critical" to conviction and
subject to varying expert opinion); Warren v. State, 288 So. 2d 826, 830 (Ala. 1973) ("Impartiality and
fairness require that the defendant be aided by all available processes of the court, when invoked, to
enable him to test and question the authenticity of the State's evidence against him."); State v. Hanson,
278 N.W.2d 198, 201 (S.D. 1979) ("The due process clauses require that the defendant have access to
the evidence as an aid to his defense ....").
269. See, e.g., Frias v. State, 547 N.E.2d 809, 813 (Ind. 1989) (reasoning that the defendant had the
opportunity to cross-examine the state's expert, had access to the state's laboratory reports, and made
no objection as to the accuracy or integrity of the State's testing procedures), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 921
(1990); People v. Borney, 313 N.W.2d 329, 332 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (reasoning that the defendant's
rights were "adequately protected by cross-examination" of the prosecution's expert); People v.
Anderson, 276 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (reasoning that the defendant's rights were
adequately protected because defense counsel was allowed unrestricted cross examination of the
prosecution's expert witness); People v. Bell, 253 N.W.2d 726, 729 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (finding no
reversible error where the defendant was afforded full cross examination of the prosecution's expert
witness); see also State v. Faraone, 425 A.2d 523, 525 (R.I. 1981) (reasoning that the defense stipulated
to the state expert's trial testimony).
270. See Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 865
(1969).
271. While the majority of the statutory provisions allow for the inspection of tangible objects which
may be material to the preparation of the defense, some provisions, as indicated by the above
parentheticals, are limited to items which the prosecuting attorney intends to use at trial. See supra note
257. Under the proffered interpretation of the Compulsory Process Clause, the defense would be entitled
to inspect and test tangible objects falling into either category, at least insofar as these tangible objects
qualify as raw evidence. Otherwise, the prosecution would enjoy the exclusive possession of raw
evidence, thereby undermining the adversary process.
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right to obtain a psychological or physical examination of a complainant or
witness whose mental or physical condition is placed in issue by the
prosecutor.272 For instance, although sexual assault prosecutions are not the
only context in which a complainant's psychological or physical condition
may be in issue, these cases frequently include prosecution evidence that the
alleged victim suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD").2" This
evidence is typically conveyed in the form of opinion testimony from a
psychologist or psychiatrist who has interviewed the alleged victim and
reached the opinion that the alleged victim's psychological symptoms and
behavior are consistent with that of someone suffering from PTSD.274 Since
sexual assault cases often hinge on the relative credibility of the defendant
and the alleged victim, PTSD evidence, which bolsters the alleged victim's
credibility, can be particularly devastating for the defendant.275
A criminal defendant would understandably want to challenge opinion
testimony that the alleged victim was suffering from PTSD. The problem that
272. Cf Pre-Trial Disclosure in Criminal Cases, supra note 78, at 644-45 (not relying on the
Compulsory Process Clause, but proposing rules of discovery procedure in criminal cases, including a
rule providing for the physical or mental examination of individuals whose condition is in issue). Of
course, when the mental or physical condition of a party is in issue in civil litigation, the psychological
or physical examination of the party is routinely available. See, e.g., ALA. R. Civ. P. 35(a); ARIZ. R.
Civ. P. 35(a); ARK. R. Civ. P. 35(a); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 2032(a) (West Supp. 1994); COLO.
R. Civ. P. 35(a); CONN. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. § 229; DEL. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 35(a); D.C. SUPER. CT.
R. Civ. P. 35(a); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(a); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-35 (1993); HAW. R. Civ. P. 35(a);
IDAHO R. Civ. P. 35(a); ILL. Sup. CT. R. 215; IND. R. TRIAL P. 35(A); IOwA R. Civ. P. 132; KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-235(a) (1983); Ky. R. Civ. P. 35.01; LA. CODE CIv. PRoc. ANN. art. 1464 (West
Supp. 1994); ME. R. Civ. P. 35(a); MD. CIR. CT. R. Civ. P. 2-423; MASS. R. Civ. P. 35(a); MICH. R.
Civ. P. 2.311(A); MINN. R. Civ. P. 35.01; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 510.040 (Vernon 1952); MONT. R. Civ.
P. 35(a); NEv. R. Civ. P. 35(a); N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 35(a); N.J. R. CIv. PRAC. 4:19; N.M. DisT. CT. R.
Civ. P. 1-035(A); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 3121 (McKinney 1991); N.C. R. Civ. P. 35(a); OHIO R.
Civ. P. 35(A); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3235 (West 1993); OR. R. CIv. P. 44(A); PA. R. Civ. P.
4010(a); R.I. R. Civ. P. 35(a); S.C. R. Civ. P. 35(a); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-6-35(a) (1984);
TENN. R. Civ. P. 35.01; TEx. R. CIv. P. CODE ANN. 167(I)(a) (West 1994); UTAH R. CIv. P. 35(a); VT.
R. Civ. P. 35(a); VA. R. Civ. P. 35(a); WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 35(a); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 35(a); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 804.10(l) (West 1994); Wyo. R. Civ. P. 35(a); see also FED. R. CIv. P. 35(a).
273. See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 602 N.E.2d 826 (II1. 1992); State v. Maday, 507 N.W.2d 365 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1993).
274. Wheeler, 602 N.E.2d at 829; Maday, 507 N.W.2d at 368.
275. See Wheeler, 602 N.E.2d at 833 (declining to find harmless error where PTSD evidence was
improperly admitted). Some courts have held PTSD evidence inadmissible. See, e.g., Commonwealth
v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830 (Pa. 1992) (holding syndrome evidence inadmissible for any purpose). Other
courts circumscribe its admissibility. See, e.g., People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291 (Cal. 1984)
(acknowledging the admissibility of syndrome evidence to explain the actions of alleged victims, but
not to show that the crime occurred); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982) (finding reversible
error in allowing expert testimony concerning typical symptoms and behavior of rape victims and
opinion evidence that the complainant was a rape victim); State v. Michaels, 625 A.2d 489 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1993) (acknowledging the admissibility of syndrome evidence to explain the actions of
alleged victims, but not to show that the crime occurred), aff'd, 642 A.2d 1372 (N.J. 1994); People v.
Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131 (N.Y. 1990) (concluding that syndrome evidence is inadmissible when it
"inescapably bears solely on proving" that a crime occurred); State v. Hall, 412 S.E.2d 883 (N.C. 1992)
(acknowledging the admissibility of syndrome evidence to explain the actions of alleged victims, but
not to show that the crime occurred). Other courts freely admit syndrome evidence. See. e.g., State v.
Delaney, 417 S.E.2d 903, 908 n.3 (W. Va. 1992) (affirming the admissibility of expert testimony that
a child complainant mirrors the psychological and behavioral traits of a child sexual abuse victim and
that the child has been sexually abused).
1995]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
arises for defendants is that the raw evidence may be inaccessible; that is, the
alleged victim may not want to submit voluntarily to an examination by a
defense expert.176 The problem for the trial court is whether to allow the
prosecution to present opinion testimony based on an examination of the
alleged victim under these circumstances. 27  Some courts have concluded
276. The psychological or physical examination of a complainant or witness is a variation of
subjecting tangible objects to testing. See supra part IV.D.2. The prosecution's trial use of expert
opinion based on an examination of the complainant or witness triggers the need for comparable defense
testing.
277. Some courts recognize the discretionary power of trial courts to order the alleged victim's
examination by a defense expert. See, e.g., State v. Rhone, 566 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(upholding the trial court's order for a psychological examination of the victim by the defense where
the state planned to use evidence of the battered woman's syndrome to prove that the victim lacked the
capacity to consent to sexual intercourse); State v. Doremus, 514 N.W.2d 649 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that the defendant was entitled to an independent psychological evaluation of the alleged sexual
assault victim where the state had the mentally retarded complainant evaluated and planned to offer
expert testimony that the complainant was incapable of consent); State v. D.R.H., 604 A.2d 89, 95 (N.J.
1992) (holding that a trial court has the discretion to order a physical examination of the complainant
and setting forth the appropriate balancing test); State v. Ramos, 553 A.2d 1059 (R.I. 1989) (recognizing
the trial court's discretionary power to order a physical examination of the complainant in a criminal
trial, but finding no abuse of discretion in denying the defendant's request for an independent
gynecological examination); Delaney, 417 S.E.2d 903 (holding that a trial court has the discretion to
order both psychological and physical examinations and setting forth the appropriate balancing test);
Maday, 507 N.W.2d 365 (holding that a trial court has the discretion to order a psychological
examination of the complainant and setting forth a balancing test); see also Judith Greenberg, Note,
Compulsory Psychological Examination in Sexual Offense Cases: Invasion of Privacy or Defendant's
Right? 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 1257 (1990) (arguing that courts generally do have the discretion to order
a psychological examination of the complaining witness). But see State v. Gabrielson, 464 N.W.2d 434
(Iowa 1990) (holding that trial courts have no authority to order sexual abuse victims to undergo
psychiatric examinations); see also Troy A. Eid, Comment, A Fourth Amendment Approach to
Compulsory Physical Examinations of Sex Offense Victims, 57 U. Cti. L. REv. 873 (1990)
(acknowledging that the prosecution's medical evidence can'be a powerful tool of persuasion and that
juries would understandably give greater credence to an examining physician, but arguing that a physical
examination of the complainant by a defense expert is not required by the Due Process Clause and
should be prohibited by the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches). In some
jurisdictions, however, this power has been circumscribed by legislation prohibiting courts from making
such orders, at least in sexual assault prosecutions. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4065 (1989)
(prohibiting courts from ordering mental examinations of victims or witnesses of designated offenses
for purposes of assessing credibility); CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1112 (West Supp. 1994) (prohibiting
courts from ordering mental examinations of victims or witnesses of sexual offenses for purposes of
assessing their credibility); IDAHO CODE § 19-3025 (Michie Supp. 1994) (prohibiting courts from
ordering mental examinations of victims or witnesses of any offense for purposes of assessing
credibility); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 115-7.1 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (prohibiting courts from ordering
mental examinations of victims or witnesses of sexual offenses). In People v. Wheeler, questionable
examinations were ordered to explore the alleged victim's general competency and credibility. 602
N.E.2d 826, 831 (111. 1992); see also State v. Camejo, 641 So. 2d 109 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(quashing an order requiring the complainant in a sexual assault prosecution to undergo a psychological
evaluation). In contrast, this section discusses when a psychological or physical examination is specially
indicated, such as when the prosecution builds its case upon the psychological or physical condition of
the complainant or witness. Cf. id. (acknowledging that the state's intention to use expert psychological
testimony may establish the requisite compelling need for a court-ordered, defense examination of the
complainant).
This Article assumes that it would be inappropriate to compel such examinations by imposing
sanctions, such as a fine or incarceration, on an unwilling complainant or witness. Nevertheless, the
more extreme sanction of entirely dismissing a prosecution has generally not been upheld by the
appellate courts. See People v. Nokes, 228 Cal. Rptr. 119, 120 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (reversing a
judgment of dismissal); State v. Diamond, 553 So. 2d 1185, 1192 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (quashing
an order enjoining prosecution unless and until the complainants first submitted to a physical
examination); D.R.H., 604 A.2d at 98 (reversing the dismissal of an indictment).
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that allowing the prosecution to present opinion testimony based on an
examination of the alleged victim does not violate the defendant's due process
rights, even though the defense is unable to have the alleged victim examined
by its own expert.2 7 8 These courts reason that there is no unfairness to the
defense since both the prosecution and the defense are at the mercy of the
alleged victim to obtain the examination, and the alleged victim voluntarily
submitted to the prosecution's request for such an examination.279 Other
courts have concluded that there is a violation of due process when the
prosecution proffers the testimony of an examining expert but the defense
cannot.2 0 These courts accordingly prohibit the prosecution from presenting
the opinion testimony of an expert based on an examination of the alleged
victim unless the defendant is afforded an opportunity to have the alleged
victim examined by a defense expert.28 '
While the latter courts reach the correct result, they take the incorrect
doctrinal road to get there, and other courts understandably refuse to follow.
There is no violation of due process in the Brady sense because the state does
not control or possess what the defendant wants: access to the alleged
victim.28 2 There is, however, a Compulsory Process Clause problem. When
278. In Gilpin v. McCormick, for instance, the defendant sought to compel psychiatric examinations
of the complaining witnesses for purposes of demonstrating an absence of rape trauma syndrome
("RTS"). 921 F.2d 928, 930 (9th Cir. 1990). The defendant argued that since the state may examine
sexual abuse victims for purposes of determining the presence of RTS and presenting evidence of its
existence, the defense must have this same privilege. Id. at 931. On this appeal, the defendant framed
his complaint as a denial of due process and a denial of his right of confrontation. Id. at 929. The Ninth
Circuit rejected both arguments. Id. at 932.
279. Id. at 931.
280. In People v. Wheeler, for instance, the defendant learned that the State intended to introduce
expert testimony that the victim suffered from RTS and sought a compelled mental examination of the
victim by the defendant's expert. 602 N.E.2d 826, 828 (Ill. 1992). The trial court denied the defendant's
motion. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, his expert should have been
permitted to examine the alleged victim. Id. at 830. In ruling that the prosecution should not be able to
present opinion testimony based on the examination of the alleged victim when the defendant could not
present comparable opinion testimony, the Supreme Court of Illinois cited United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683 (1974), for the proposition that "[ojur system of criminal justice requires a complete
presentation of the facts." Wheeler, 602 N.E.2d at 832. Nevertheless, the court also cited Pennsylvania
v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), for the proposition that "the compulsory process clause offers no greater
protection than that afforded by the due process clause." Wheeler, 602 N.E.2d at 830. Accordingly, the
court based its decision on the Due Process Clause. Id.; see also State v. Maday, 507 N.W.2d 365 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1993) (applying the Due Process Clause and reaching the same conclusion as Wheeler).
281. Wheeler, 602 N.E.2d at 833; see also State v. Horn, 446 S.E.2d 52, 54 (N.C. 1994) (citing the
defendant's right to present a defense and holding that the trial court "may deny the admission of the
State's proffered psychological evidence demonstrating the alleged victim's mentally deficient status")
(emphasis added).
282. For instance, in People v. Webb, a murder prosecution in which a death sentence was imposed,
the defendant sought the psychiatric records of the prosecution's star witness. 862 P.2d 779, 792 (Cal.
1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 123 (1994). The defendant argued that, assuming the psychiatric records
showed that the witness suffered from "delusions" or other mental disorders affecting her competence
or credibility as a witness, the defendant's right to "fairly cross-examine her under the due process and
confrontation clauses of the federal Constitution would prevail over any state law privilege or privacy
interest" of the witness in the records. Id. at 792-93. The prosecutor seemed to agree. Id. at 793. The
California Supreme Court, however, applying Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), questioned
whether the "records stemming from [the witness'] voluntary treatment by private and county therapists
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the prosecution presents expert opinion testimony based on an examination of
the alleged victim, but the defendant cannot present his own comparable
evidence, the prosecution's evidence is insulated from the testing anticipated
by the Compulsory Process Clause. Courts therefore appropriately exclude
prosecution evidence based on an examination of the alleged victim when the
defense is precluded from making a comparable examination. Moreover, the
Compulsory Process Clause, and not the Due Process Clause, is the appro-
priate basis for this result precisely because the government is not in
possession of the information sought by the defendant: The defendant does not
seek the reports of the state experts (A la Brady/Ritchie), but an examination
of the alleged victim by a defense expert (A la Nixon/Burr). Truth-seeking is
served because the defendant is able to check the prosecution's presentation
of the evidence.
V. CONCLUSION
In 1961, Professor Louisell asked, "Will criminal discovery remain the
perpetual adolescent of the adversary system?" '83  In 1995, criminal
discovery continues to lag well behind its civil counterpart in aiding the quest
for truth at trial. Perhaps recognizing the "checking" function of the
Compulsory Process Clause and grounding at least certain discovery rights in
the Clause to effect that function will hasten criminal discovery's maturity.
Distinguishing a right to discover the raw evidence (grounded in the
Compulsory Process Clause) from a right to discover information produced
by government investigative efforts (grounded in the Due Process Clause)
advances our adversary system of criminal justice. It eliminates the apprehen-
sion that the prosecution will be investigating the case for the defendant by
empowering the defense to do its own investigation.
Not only are such discovery rights theoretically sound, but they are of
practical significance to the litigation. First, grounding certain discovery rights
in the Compulsory Process Clause would not supplant but would supplement
[could] be deemed 'in the possession' of the 'government' in the manner assumed by Ritchie.' Webb,
862 P.2d at 794. The court deemed it "likely that [the] defendant has no constitutional right to examine
the records," since "[tihe records were not generated or obtained by the People in the course of a
criminal investigation, and the People have had no greater access to them than [the] defendant." Id.; see
also Bartlett v. Hamwi, 626 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the circumstances did
not justify a court order authorizing the taking of hair samples from a witness, by reasoning, in part, that
the case did not involve the prosecution's failure to produce evidence in existence or the destruction of
previously existing evidence); People v. Nicholas, 157 Misc. 2d 947 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (finding that
the defendant inappropriately relied on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), to inspect and
photograph the crime scene-the apartment he formerly shared with his estranged wife, the
complainant-since the premises were not under state control, but that the right to compulsory process
raised a colorable claim); Eid, supra note 277, at 879 (arguing that the Due Process Clause is
inapplicable to defense requests to have an independent physical examination of the complainant, since
"the prosecution cannot disclose what it does not have," and "the prosecution does not possess the
complainant's vagina or rectum" and therefore "cannot 'disclose' them to the defendant's experts").
283. Louisell, supra note 78, at 60.
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the discovery opportunities guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.284
Secondly, a heightened standard of review would apply. A due process
analysis (A la Brady) asks whether there is a reasonable probability that
disclosure of the evidence would have affected the outcome at trial, but this
due process standard is concerned with effecting fairness and justice when the
ordinary adversarial process does not suffice to bring about these ends. 8
Moreover, the evidence at issue is certain (e.g., the co-participant's confession
in Brady); the reviewing court is therefore able to examine the record of the
entire trial to determine the effect of its exclusion. A Compulsory Process
Clause analysis would be concerned with effecting adversariness, the very
essence of our criminal justice system, and appropriately would require a
showing that the trial court's error was at least harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt." 6 With a Compulsory Process Clause violation of the type described
here (e.g., admitting accusatory or incriminating hearsay evidence in lieu of
live testimony when the defendant has been unable to obtain pretrial access
to an available hearsay declarant, or admitting expert opinion testimony based
on scientific testing of some tangible object when the defendant has been
unable to conduct independent testing), one is concerned not with the
exclusion of certain evidence, but with the inability to access and assess the
raw evidence for purposes of checking the prosecution's presentation of the
evidence and mounting a defense. The reviewing court can only speculate as
to what information might have been uncovered, let alone how hamstringing
the defense might have affected the trial. It therefore will be appropriate in
many instances to remand the case to allow the defendant to depose the
witness or test the tangible object to determine whether a retrial is warranted.
If the notion of grounding certain discovery rights in the Compulsory
Process Clause should fail, recognizing the importance of "checking" the
prosecution's presentation of the evidence to truth-seeking at trial-and
distinguishing the discovery of raw evidence from the product of the
government's investigative efforts-provides a sound theoretical framework
for statutory reform or trial court decisions regarding discovery in criminal
284. Of course, like Confrontation Clause rights, Compulsory Process Clause discovery rights would
not be absolute. For instance, it would not make sense to disallow a prosecution expert's opinion of
forcible trauma based on a physical examination of an alleged rape victim if the passage of time would
render a later defense examination irrelevant. Rape often does not result in permanent physical injury.
See People v. Nokes, 228 Cal. Rptr. 119, 126 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Delaney, 417 S.E.2d 903,
907-08 (f. Va. 1992).
285. See supra notes 224-230 and accompanying text.
286. In Arizona v. Fulminante, the Supreme Court distinguished "trial errors," which lend themselves
to quantitative assessment in the context of other evidence, from "structural defects," which defy a
harmless error analysis and require automatic reveisal. 499 U.S. 279, 306-10 (1991). For a discussion
of the history and uncertain parameters of harmless error and automatic reversal as applied to
constitutional violations, see LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 70, § 27.6(c)-(e), at 1166-75. In any event,
a harmless error analysis would afford defendants more protection than Brady's reasonable probability
test. See id. §27.6(d), at 1168 (observing that "the presence of the requisite 'reasonable probability'
necessarily establishes the reasonable doubt required for a new trial under [the harmless error
standard]"); Daniel J. Meltzer, Harmless Error and Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3
(1994) (observing that a reasonable probability test is "a standard far less protective of defendants than
that of [the] Chapman [harmless error standard]").
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cases. Legislatures and trial courts should step into the gap created by the
Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and allow defendants to
depose recalcitrant hearsay declarants when the prosecution chooses to present
incriminating or accusatory hearsay evidence in lieu of live testimony at trial.
They should further allow defendants to test and retest real evidence and
otherwise provide for defense testing of the raw evidence. In the alternative,
the prosecution should be prohibited from presenting raw evidence in distilled
forms (that is, accusatory or incriminating hearsay evidence or expert opinion)
unless the defense has been able to access and assess the raw evidence. A
sound "fact-determination process" requires this.287
287. See generally Jonakait, supra note 85 (discussing the importance of more accurate and complete
evidence to truth-finding at trial, even when the Constitution and the existing rules of evidence do not
seem to require it).
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